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## Navy

**The aircraft carrier industry will collapse now and drag the navy down with it – budget cuts, cost-overruns, and reach of CVW**

**Goure 13** - vice president at the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Virginia, where he specializes in national security <Daniel. “Drones to The Rescue!” September 2013. <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-09/drones-rescue>>

The issue is important because, as anyone who has been following the recent budgetary developments in Washington knows, the future of the carrier is under increasing stress. Critics have contended that the Navy’s longstanding strategy of building the Fleet around a core of 11 nuclear aircraft carriers is becoming too expensive, and that the concept has been unable to keep pace with the rapidly growing array of threats from potential adversaries. And with the retirement of aging aircraft systems such as the A-6 and the S-3, some say the overall striking power of the carrier air wing has declined.Indeed, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel disclosed on 31 July that one of the largest potential spending cuts that a “strategic choices and management review” panel suggested earlier this year was to reduce the number of carrier strike groups from the current 11 to a new level of only eight or nine. “The basic tradeoff is between capacity . . . and our ability to modernize weapons systems and to maintain our military’s technological edge,” the secretary said. It’s here that the X-47B’s mid-July milestone was especially significant. The drone was developed as part of the Navy’s effort to design and test a UAV-centered unmanned combat air system. During the week that the Bush demonstration was being conducted, the Navy invited four defense contractors to submit preliminary design studies for an unmanned carrier-launched airborne surveillance and strike system, known as UCLASS. The Navy’s hope is to conduct an open competition in Fiscal Year 2014 that will result in the deployment of an operational system by FY 20.¶ The key performance parameters set out in the Navy’s invitation answered several lingering questions about the operational concept for UCLASS. The system’s primary role will be to conduct long-distance intelligence-gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and to improve targeting. According to published documents, the UCLASS system must be able to conduct two unrefueled orbits at 600 nautical miles or one unrefueled orbit at 1,200 nautical miles. In lightly contested environments, it must be able to conduct strike missions out to 2,000 nautical miles. The drone must be able to lift a 3,000-pound payload, made up primarily of sensors but including 1,000 pounds of air-to-surface weapons such as the 500-pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMS) and the Small Diameter Bomb II. Even with such capabilities, contractors will have to keep the price-tag for UCLASS under $150 million, not including items such as sensor packages, weapons, spare parts, and training.¶ The modest performance parameters indicate that, despite the potential, once the UCLASS system gets off the ground, the Navy will take a cautious, step-by-step approach. The focus on the ISR and light-attack missions means that UCLASS drones do not require high speed, extreme agility, or even stealth features. This, in turn, will simplify design and production and, in a time of growing austerity, reduce cost. Just as important, the UCLASS will fill a significant void in carrier-based long-endurance/long-distance ISR, essentially doubling the duration of these operations. The limited air-to-ground capability envisioned for the UCLASS drone means that it will supplement—but not replace—the primary strike force of the carrier air wing, the F/A-18 E/F (and soon the F-35C as well).¶ As currently envisioned, the new system will be only a small step toward defining the carrier air wing of the future. But if it succeeds and is expanded, UCLASS—and the systems that follow it—could prove to be important elements in the debate over future missions for the modern aircraft carrier and how many CVNs to retain in the Fleet.¶ It’s been a long time since there was a serious discussion about the future of the aircraft carrier. Yet, with growing frequency and intensity, Navy strategists (and periodicals such as Proceedings ) have been questioning the central place given to the CVN in Navy strategy and shipbuilding plan The issue that has drawn the greatest attention is how vulnerable critics say the aircraft carrier has become in the face of a number of emerging threats. China has developed new antiship ballistic missiles with guided warheads, which seem designed to target large naval vessels such as carriers. 2 And potential U.S. adversaries have acquired a raft of new weapons for anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) operations, from manned aircraft and sea-skimming cruise-missiles that can be delivered from land, sea, or air to diesel-electric submarines. Taken together, the critics contend, these will place the United States’ entire surface Navy at greater risk and force the carrier strike group to take additional protective measures that could include operating farther from hostile shores or even restricting overall offense operations significantly. ¶ A second issue, which has gained greater prominence in the face of congressional calls for deep defense spending cuts, is the cost of naval aviation—from building and maintaining aircraft carriers to deploying their air wings and supporting vessels. The soaring cost overruns and construction delays in the production of the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), the first of a new class of Navy super-carriers, have raised concerns both within the Navy and on Capitol Hill. 4 At the same time, the cost of the carrier air wing is rising visibly even though it is shrinking in size. 5 Navy leadership and a number of outside experts have offered a spirited defense of the Ford -class carriers. 6¶ The third challenge—and the most central for the future of the UCLASS drone and its successors—is that of making sure that the future carrier air wing (CVW) is effective. Early assessments of the potential for UAVs to enhance the utility of the carrier air wing focused on the value of their greater range and persistence. 7 As Representative J. Randy Forbes (R-VA), chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on seapower and projection forces, has argued, the issues of reach and persistence remain the most serious weaknesses of the CVW—particularly in the face of the Obama administration’s new, more intense focus on Asia.¶ [T]he long distances in the region, combined with A2/AD challenges, raise questions about the future strike power of the Carrier Air-Wing (CVW). As we posture our forces, is the planned CVW of the 2020s structured to meet the range, persistence, stealth, ISR, and payload demands that will be required to operate in this theater? 8

#### Carriers make basing and the US Navy effective – key to maintaining presence without escalation

**Rabus 13**, Ray, M.A. in political science from Johns Hopkins University and a Juris Doctor, magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School, “Technology On Approach: Unmanned aircraft at sea greatly extend the Navy’s reach and sustainability,” July 13th, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/Jul/14/tp-technology-on-approach/2/?#article-copy

On Wednesday afternoon, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert and I stood on the deck of the aircraft carrier George H.W. Bush, at sea off the Virginia Capes, and watched the winning argument in that debate. The unmanned aircraft X-47B, with its stealthy airframe and 62-foot wingspan, made its first arrested landing onboard a ship. It was a historic moment for aviation, a remarkable achievement of naval power and a powerful demonstration of why aircraft carriers will remain relevant and critical to America’s future naval supremacy. As every naval aviator knows, landing on a carrier is about the most difficult thing you can do. To put it simply, an aircraft carrier, unlike an air base ashore, moves. So landing the X-47B safely aboard the ship without a human operator requires a very sophisticated computer system capable of factoring in airspeed, altitude and angle-of-attack to a pitching, rolling flight deck, not to mention the changing winds and seas. In less than a decade, the air wing on a carrier will include today’s modern manned strike fighters, advanced future manned platforms like the Joint Strike Fighter, and our next generation unmanned carrier aircraft. Today was a glimpse at how the carrier and its changing mix of aircraft will be integral to meeting the challenges of the 21st century. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are America’s “Away Team.” We are where it counts, when it counts, not just at the right time but all the time. In military terms, we provide presence. Aircraft carriers are critical to maintaining constant presence and the ability to be on the scene without dangerously escalating a tense situation. The president needs this flexibility when a crisis erupts. A carrier’s ability to be an enduring and mobile presence without needing an inch of another country’s sovereign territory contrasts starkly with attack aircraft at fixed locations based on foreign soil. There are certainly threats to our carriers. Potential adversaries and friends alike are developing more advanced anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles for targeting ships at sea. However, these same missile technologies pose a greater threat to immobile airfields ashore. Targeting information for fixed shore bases is relatively easy. A moving carrier far at sea is a much harder problem for our adversaries to solve, and our advancing electronic warfare capabilities make it even harder. Add to this the fact that the AEGIS combat system of our cruisers and destroyers, which deploy with our carriers, is proven and reliable in air and missile defense, and the survivability of our carriers looks far more impressive than airfields ashore. The X-47B that “trapped” aboard the Bush on Wednesday is the culmination of an experimental program. It has been one of the Navy’s most successful, meeting all required objectives within budget and on time. The operational unmanned aircraft that will follow it will radically change the way presence and combat power is delivered from aircraft carriers by conducting surveillance and strike missions at extreme distances and over very long periods of time. With this advanced technology, we will put fewer sailors and Marines in harm’s way, and we will push the area of potential action even farther from the decks of our ships. And it’s more efficient. Because unmanned carrier aircraft do not require flights to maintain pilot proficiency, they will deploy only for operational missions, saving fuel costs and extending the service life of the aircraft. Not only will future carrier air wings be more combat effective, they will cost less to build, and less expensive airframes means we can build more and use them differently, like developing swarm tactics and performing maneuvers that require more G force than a human body can withstand. The unmanned systems and platforms we are developing today are wholly integrated with our manned ships, aircraft and submarines.

#### US naval strength key to de-escalate global conflict

**Cropsey 10 –** is a Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute. Previously, he served as Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy during both the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. (Seth, September 1, “Ebb Tide” <http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=7235>) Jacome

Only one statement can be made with certainty about the future of the U.S. Navy: Its strength is a necessary precondition of U.S. continuance as a great power. A robust, globally distributed and technologically superior naval force does not ensure the future of American international preeminence, but a waning fleet composed of fewer and less fearsome vessels guarantees the decline of U.S. influence in the world. Venice, Spain, Holland, France and England learned the identical lesson over the past 500 years: The loss of seapower paralleled and was in large measure responsible for their decline as great powers. Seapower is an uncommonly flexible instrument of national power. It can and has been used to supply humanitarian assistance, as it did for the survivors of the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 and more recently following the Haitian earthquake in January 2010. It can be used to pummel an enemy, as carrier-based strike craft are doing today to our enemies in Afghanistan. The Navy critically supports the amphibious operations of the U.S. Marines. It also supports important national purposes that fall between disaster relief and combat. For example, it supports our trade in and access to strategic resources, keeps sea lanes secure in peace and war, and assures allies of our presence and commitment. By maintaining sufficient combat power to provide allies with security by deterring and protecting against ballistic missile attack, it reduces the incentives to proliferate weapons of mass destruction and lowers the prospect of destabilizing regional security competitions. And the Navy, last but not least, also reinforces U.S. diplomacy, collects intelligence and supports homeland security by monitoring the movement of potentially dangerous cargo destined for U.S. or allied ports. A shorter, more conceptual way of putting all this is to say that U.S. seapower protects our vital interest in a benign international order, thus providing a global common good that simultaneously enables America to do well for itself and to do good for others. Despite the critical role of the Navy, the prevalence of land conflicts in recent years—the 1989 invasion of Panama, the 1990–91 Gulf War, the Balkan wars of the 1990s, the post-September 11 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (and the ongoing counterinsurgency campaigns there)—have propelled American seapower into virtual obscurity. This is not to say that the Navy has not participated in all these conflicts, but that the historically unprecedented concentration on land warfare has led a generation of American lawmakers, their staffs, policy experts and the media to take U.S. maritime interests for granted. This has engendered an unprecedented ignorance of the political and broadly strategic role of seapower in providing American and global security. American Presidents from George Washington to George H.W. Bush knew from history and their own experience alike that America was preeminently a seapower, and that American security has been inseparable from the development of seapower and the ideas that govern it. It still is. Indeed, the demand for U.S. seapower will only grow in the years ahead. It will grow, for example, if Iran becomes a nuclear power and the oil-rich Gulf states require shelter under an American deterrent umbrella. The Obama Administration has already increased the demand for naval force by promising to place a U.S. seaborne ballistic missile shield in the Mediterranean to protect Europe against intermediate-range Iranian ballistic missiles. But if Iran is a jihadist state with nuclear ambitions, Pakistan is an existing nuclear state with a potential to turn jihadist or to collapse. Pakistan’s shaky future and Turkey’s increasingly problematic descent into the hands of Islamist rule will almost certainly enlarge demand for U.S. deterrent naval force in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean. Then there is China, whose growing wealth, nationalism, ambition and need for energy and raw materials have prompted it to cultivate an expanding, increasingly powerful navy, one of whose explicit goals is to deny U.S. naval vessels access to the western Pacific. This is an objective that China’s growing inventory of sophisticated anti-ship ballistic missiles brings into the realm of possibility. The United States is, or at any rate ought to be, as resistant to an Asian hegemon as it was to a European or Eurasian one in the World Wars and the Cold War that followed. To note that China is neither a liberal state nor likely to become one soon is not tantamount to searching abroad for monsters to destroy. Nor is it spiting hope to point out that regional balances against potential hegemons do not burst spontaneously into being. China’s brand of politicized mercantilism precludes meaningful partnerships with the United States on issues of strategic gravity. In that light, Chinese hegemony in East Asia would undermine or neutralize U.S. military, diplomatic and economic relations with nations ranging from Japan to India, exacting a cost to America’s international position that cannot be readily imagined. No single instrument of U.S. policy is more effective than a strong U.S. Navy at moderating Chinese behavior—behavior such as its challenges to U.S. intelligence ships in international waters, its belligerent and recently expanded territorial claims to the South China Sea, or its de facto support for Iran’s nuclear program. American power is a necessary ingredient in a peaceful balance of power and perception in Asia. A U.S. Navy that can defend itself, protect American allies and continue the stabilizing presence of American forces in the western Pacific is the best way to prevent major conflicts. Its absence or abject weakness would be an invitation to calamity.

#### Specifically, naval supremacy is key to solve US-China war over the South China Sea, Japan, and Taiwan

**Felzenberg and Gray 11** – (Alvin S. Felzenberg, Professorial Lecturer at The Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Presidential Historian and Adjunct Faculty Member at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, former Fellow at the Institute of Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, served as Principal Spokesman for the 9/11 Commission, holds a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University**,**and Alexander B. Gray, Student at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and the War Studies Department of King’s College, London, 01-03-2011 “The New Isolationism,” The National Review, January 3rd, Available Online at <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/print/256150>)

China, while continuing to upgrade its naval capabilities, grows increasingly assertive. In pursuit of its own Monroe Doctrine for East Asia, Beijing has proclaimed its sovereignty over the entire South China Sea, menaced neighbors from India to Vietnam, used its economic muscle to intimidate Japan, and increased its threats against Taiwan. China’s leaders have been studying the writings of the 19th-century American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who demonstrated the connection between sea power and economic strength. At the turn of the last century, Theodore Roosevelt found in Mahan the blueprint for achieving unprecedented American influence in world affairs. His efforts to build both a strong navy and a sound economy ushered in the “American century,” the period in which the United States became a force for good throughout the world and a beacon of hope for those yearning to breathe free. In pursuing a “blue-water” ocean-going navy capable of supporting their expanding global economic ambitions, the Chinese are acting from a desire to defend their nation’s trade and access to world markets, with a focus on energy supplies. It is critical that the Chinese — who are closely studying both Mahan’s writings and the history of the Monroe Doctrine — and Americans who see Chinese hegemony over Asia as either inevitable or a price they are willing to pay in exchange for slashing defense spending not draw the wrong lessons from history. Both sides should understand that it was not American might that gave the Monroe Doctrine force, but the then all-powerful British navy. For much of the 19th century, Great Britain had reasons of its own for keeping other nations out of the Western Hemisphere and for wanting to see the United States develop internally. If appropriately funded, the United States Navy has the capacity to play a similar role in China’s rise — perhaps, in the process, influencing how China develops. Should China conclude that the United States intends to remain a visible and active presence in the region, it will respond accordingly. Acting together, the two nations might embark on a series of cooperative ventures designed to help assure a steady flow of trade and an unimpeded exchange of people, goods, and ideas. They can also work together to combat a rise in piracy and terrorism in Asia and elsewhere and to respond to humanitarian crises, like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. For its part, China, should it continue to hold North Korea in check, will achieve some of the status it seeks as a rising world power, with commensurate influence on the world stage. Should China conclude, on the other hand, that the United States intends to turn inward, it may grow even more ambitious and assertive in its region and beyond, potentially menacing world peace. Its smaller neighbors nervously wait to see how the United States will respond to China’s growing assertiveness. Should they come to believe that the U.S. is in retreat, they will make their own accommodations with Beijing. That result would wreak irreparable damage both to America’s economy and to its security. Messrs. Frank and Paul and their supporters have taken it into their minds that a reduced American presence in world affairs, particularly where the military is involved, would be a good thing. They had better think again: World politics, like nature, is hardly prone to respect vacuums. Iran and Venezuela remain as bellicose and destabilizing as ever, in spite of two years of Obama “engagement.” Iran squats beside the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of the world’s energy supply travels. Iran has also, the original Monroe Doctrine be damned, extended its military cooperation with Hugo Chávez’s authoritarian regime. Evidence is strong that Venezuela is providing sanctuary for Hezbollah terrorists in South America. The alliance of these two anti-American and increasingly menacing states could pose a threat to the United States of a kind that would make us nostalgic for the Cuban Missile Crisis. Faced with such challenges, the United States can ill afford military retrenchment as advocated by the new isolationists. While waste in the Pentagon’s budget can and should be cut, the new isolationists want to do it with a chainsaw when a scalpel is needed. In the last decade, the U.S. Navy’s fleet has shrunk to its smallest size since the 19th century, just as potential rivals such as China have not only expanded theirs but have begun to target perceived American maritime vulnerabilities. The U.S. Air Force is fielding an aging and shrinking force, while China is developing an advanced fighter for sale to adversaries of America, including Iran. A world in which the United States willingly ceded power and influence would both be more dangerous and prove less receptive to values that most Americans share, such as respect for human rights, the need to restrain governments through the rule of law, and the sanctity of contracts. By reducing its military strength to alarmingly low levels, the United States would create dangerous power vacuums around the world that other nations, with entirely different values, would be only too happy to fill. That, as history shows, would make war more, rather than less, likely. Congress and the president would do well to reflect on those lessons and remember their duty to provide a dominant American military presence on land, at sea, and in the air.

#### That goes nuclear

**Kulacki 12**, Gregory, Senior Analyst & China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, “The Risk of Nuclear War with China,” 9/21, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gregory-kulacki/the-risk-of-nuclear-war-w_b_1903336.html>

Last week two separate studies warned that China and the United States are pursuing military strategies and implementing defense policies that could lead to a nuclear war. John Lewis and Xue Litai of Stanford University concluded a detailed exposition of China's nuclear war plans with a very sober warning. "Both sides, clinging to incongruous assessments, run the risk of provoking unanticipated escalation to nuclear war by seeking a quick victory or tactical advantages in a conventional conflict. This dilemma is not only real, but perilous." Thomas Christensen of Princeton expressed concern about the same problem; the possibility that a conventional military conflict between the United States and China could end in a nuclear exchange. "For example, if strikes by the United States on China's conventional coercive capabilities or their critical command and control nodes and supporting infrastructure were to appear in Beijing as a conventional attack on its nuclear retaliatory capability or as a precursor to a nuclear first strike, even a China that generally adheres to a No-First-Use posture might escalate to the nuclear level." Neither study suggests that the military or political leadership of China or the United States intends to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of a military conflict. China's commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons "at any time under any circumstances" is drilled into the officers and soldiers of China's strategic missile forces. A classified text used to train those forces, The Science of Second Artillery Operations, unambiguously instructs, "In accord with our national principle not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, the Second Artillery's strategic nuclear forces can carry out a retaliatory nuclear attack against the enemy, following the command of the 'high leadership,' only after the enemy has first attacked us with nuclear weapons." Although the United States is unwilling to make a similar commitment, U.S. superiority in conventional weapons and overall military capabilities makes it unlikely the United States would consider using nuclear weapons for any purpose other than preventing a Chinese nuclear attack on the United States. The most recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, in an effort to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy, declared that the "fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons...is to deter a nuclear attack on the United States, our allies and partners." The risk of a nuclear war with China lies in the potential for misunderstanding or miscommunication during a conventional conflict. China's current strategy for employing its conventional and nuclear missile forces during a future conflict with the United States is self-consciously designed to create uncertainty, with the expectation that uncertainty will restrain U.S. military action. Unfortunately, China's strategy could also precipitate a large-scale U.S. attack on China's missile forces. There are several Chinese military policies that might confuse U.S. decision-makers in a time of war. Some Chinese conventional missiles are located on the same missile bases as Chinese nuclear missiles. Some Chinese missiles, particularly the DF-21, can be armed with either a conventional or a nuclear warhead. Chinese conventional war plans call for long-range "strategic" conventional missile strikes at key enemy targets, including U.S. military bases on allied soil and the continental United States. If this were not confusing enough already, The Science of Second Artillery Operations contains a section on "lowering the nuclear threshold" that details procedures for alerting China's nuclear forces in a crisis for the express purpose of forcing a halt to an enemy's conventional attacks on a select group of targets, such as Chinese nuclear power plants, large dams and civilian population centers. Although the Science of Second Artillery Operations unambiguously states that if alerting China's nuclear missile forces fails to halt conventional enemy attacks China will hold firm to its "no first use" commitment, U.S. decision-makers might not believe it. Indeed, U.S. interlocutors have repeatedly told their Chinese counterparts that they do not find China's "no first use" pledge credible. The combination of these factors makes a nuclear exchange between the United States and China not only plausible, but also probable if the two countries were to become embroiled in a military conflict. As Lewis and Xue explain, "If, in a time of high tension, the Chinese command authorized a conventional missile attack as an act of preemptive self-defense, the enemy and its allies could not know if the incoming missiles were conventional or nuclear. In a worst-case scenario, a Chinese first-strike conventional attack could spark retaliation that destroys Chinese nuclear assets, creating a situation in which escalation to full-scale nuclear war would not just be possible, but even likely." The Obama administration is "rebalancing" U.S. military forces in response to perceived relative increases in Chinese military capabilities. China sees this so-called "pivot" to Asia, especially when pared with new U.S. military strategies such as "Air-Sea Battle," as a policy of containment. Both sides downplay the risks of conflict, but they also see each other as potential adversaries, and are hedging their diplomatic bets with expensive investments in new military hardware, including new technologies that will expand the conflict into cyberspace and outer space. Territorial disputes between China and U.S. allies, rising nationalist sentiment in the region, and the potential for domestic political instability within China could produce any number of casussen belli that could trigger the conventional conflict that carries the risk of ending in a nuclear war.

**Drones save the carrier industry – cost effectiveness and persistence**

**Goure 13** - vice president at the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Virginia, where he specializes in national security <Daniel. “Drones to The Rescue!” September 2013. <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-09/drones-rescue>>

The current budget squeeze has revived the debate about whether to reduce the number of the Navy’s aircraft carriers, but the prospective addition of unmanned aerial vehicles to the flattop’s arsenal will make the ships even more valuable in coming years.¶ When the X-47B Salty Dog 502 became the first drone to land on an aircraft carrier in July, Navy officials properly hailed the event as a technological milestone. Not only did the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) catapult from the flight deck of the USS George H. W. Bush (CVN-77) and successfully perform touch-and-go exercises and two landings, catching the tailhook wire with precision, but it did all of that autonomously, using its own robot “brain” of complex algorithms without need of a human drone operator as most other UAVs require. “It’s not often you get a chance to see the future, but that is what we got today,” Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus declared after the demonstration.¶ But the success of the X-47B landing marked more than just a technological achievement; it also injected a new element into the recently revived strategic debate over how many aircraft carriers the Navy will need in coming years. As part of an advanced surveillance-and-strike system that the Navy is developing, drones will soon be able to conduct long-range, ’round-the-clock intelligence-gathering missions and aerial attacks that will make carriers cheaper to build, less costly to operate, and far more effective, and will spawn radical changes in the way the Navy uses them. As a result, the addition of the drone to the naval aviation carrier force may prove to be a major factor in saving the flattop from becoming an endangered species.

**And, Independtly, Drones are key to make carriers A2AD resistant by enhancing range of attack and flexibility**

**Goure 13**, Daniel, vice president at the Lexington Institute, “Drones to the Rescue,” September, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-09/drones-rescue

The issue that has drawn the greatest attention is how vulnerable critics say the aircraft carrier has become in the face of a number of emerging threats. China has developed new antiship ballistic missiles with guided warheads, which seem designed to target large naval vessels such as carriers. 2 And potential U.S. adversaries have acquired a raft of new weapons for anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) operations, from manned aircraft and sea-skimming cruise-missiles that can be delivered from land, sea, or air to diesel-electric submarines. Taken together, the critics contend, these will place the United States’ entire surface Navy at greater risk and force the carrier strike group to take additional protective measures that could include operating farther from hostile shores or even restricting overall offense operations ugh it is shrinking in size. 5 Navy leadership and a number of outside experts have offered a spirited defense of the Ford -class carriers. 6 significantly. 3 A second issue, which has gained greater prominence in the face of congressional calls for deep defense spending cuts, is the cost of naval aviation—from building and maintaining aircraft carriers to deploying their air wings and supporting vessels. The soaring cost overruns and construction delays in the production of the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), the first of a new class of Navy super-carriers, have raised concerns both within the Navy and on Capitol Hill. The third challenge—and the most central for the future of the UCLASS drone and its successors—is that of making sure that the future carrier air wing (CVW) is effective. Early assessments of the potential for UAVs to enhance the utility of the carrier air wing focused on the value of their greater range and persistence. 7 As Representative J. Randy Forbes (R-VA), chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on seapower and projection forces, has argued, the issues of reach and persistence remain the most serious weaknesses of the CVW—particularly in the face of the Obama administration’s new, more intense focus on Asia. [T]he long distances in the region, combined with A2/AD challenges, raise questions about the future strike power of the Carrier Air-Wing (CVW). As we posture our forces, is the planned CVW of the 2020s structured to meet the range, persistence, stealth, ISR, and payload demands that will be required to operate in this theater? 8 The CVW of the near-future also is in flux. The F/A-18 E/F will play a significant role in both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions for the next several decades. The F-35C, long styled as the eventual centerpiece of the air wing, soon will be deployed. The EF-18G Growler is on the decks and will be upgraded with the Next-Generation Jammer. The Navy plans to acquire 75 E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes, which provide a leap forward in airborne ISR and networked fire control, but production of these is slowing. Finally, the MH-60R will provide a substantial increase in the CVW’s antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Yet, if UCLASS is to be anything more than a show horse, it must pull its weight in the continuing evolution of the CVW. This means that its designers will have to address some of the challenges facing the carrier and the air wing and also set the stage for exploiting the full potential of the new Ford -class CVN. The Navy’s invitation to contractors clearly is designed to produce a UCLASS drone system that will be a workhorse for the CVW. In its ISR role, UCLASS will significantly expand the carrier strike group’s ability to see, assess, and respond to threats. This is of particular importance in the context of the Asia-Pacific pivot as well as the proliferation of longer-range antiship missiles. Equally important, UCLASS will make it possible for a single air wing to conduct ’round-the-clock air and maritime surveillance. Finally, in its light-attack role, UCLASS will expand both the reach and flexibility of the air wing, allowing the more capable F/A-18 E/Fs and F-35s to be employed where their advanced features are most appropriate. The ability of the UCLASS to loiter while carrying heavier weapons than a Hellfire missile will be especially valuable in low-intensity conflicts, where exquisite precision strikes have become the norm. 9 Flexibility will be another important attribute for the winning UCLASS design. Given rapid advances in sensors, weapons, and networking, the UCLASS needs to have inherent flexibility and some room for growth to allow the carrier air wings to experiment with it and incorporate lessons learned from the system’s initial employment. Over the longer-term, for the current challenges to the continuation of the aircraft carrier as the Navy’s primary ship, designers of the UCLASS will have to integrate the new program into the operational policies of the carrier air wing and exploit the inherent strengths of the Ford -class CVNs. In his speech marking the successful carrier landing of the X-47B, Navy Secretary Mabus suggested how unmanned systems will address all three of the challenges to the aircraft carrier.

**Iran’s developing A2AD capabilities to close the Strait of Hormuz – causes oil price spikes and economic collapse**

**Isenberg 12**, David, adjunct scholar with the Cato Institute, a US Navy veteran, and the author of the book, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq [“Iran well prepared for the worst,” January 31st, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/NA31Ak02.html>]

According to the report published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), "Iran, in particular, has been investing in new capabilities that could be used to deter, delay or prevent effective US military operations in the Persian Gulf. Iran's acquisitions of weapons that it could use to deny access to the Gulf, control the flow of oil and gas from the region, and conduct acts of aggression or coercion, are of grave concern to the United States and its security partners." The report, "Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran's Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats" [1] notes that Iran has been preparing for a possible military confrontation with the United States for decades. Instead of engaging in a direct military competition, which would be pitting its weaknesses against US strengths, Iran has developed an asymmetric "hybrid" A2/AD strategy that mixes advanced technology with guerilla tactics to deny US forces basing access and maritime freedom of maneuver. Even if Iran did not disrupt Gulf maritime traffic for long, it could still have a devastating impact. A recent report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz would "neutralize a large part of current OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] spare capacity," saying "alternative routes exist, but only for a tiny fraction of the amounts shipped through the strait, and they may take some time to operationalize while transportation costs would rise significantly." "A blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would constitute, and be perceived by markets to presage, sharply heightened global geopolitical tension involving a much larger and unprecedented disruption," it said. The IMF said that "supply disruption would likely have a large effect on prices, not only reflecting relatively insensitive supply and demand in the short run but also the current state of oil market buffers". "A halt of Iran's exports to OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] economies without offset from other sources would likely trigger an initial oil price increase of around 20-30% (about US$20-30 a barrel currently), with other producers or emergency stock releases likely providing some offset over time," the report showed. It stressed that "a Strait of Hormuz closure could trigger a much larger price spike, including by limiting offsetting supplies from other producers in the region". "**If you could cut off oil flow for even several weeks the global economy would be in depression.** That would be a serious price to pay; it is a sobering thought," according to Patrick Cronin, a senior advisor at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington DC think-tank.

#### Oil shocks cause war

**Roberts 04** (Paul, Regular Contributor to Harpers and NYT Magazine, “The End of Oil: On The Edge of a Perilous New World”, p. 93-94)

The obsessive focus on oil is hardly surprising, given the stakes. In the fast-moving world of oil politics, oil is not simply a source of world power, but a medium for that power as well, a substance whose huge importance enmeshes companies, communities, and entire nations in a taut global web that is sensitive to the smallest of vibrations. A single oil "event" — a pipeline explosion in Iraq, political unrest in Venezuela, a bellicose exchange between the Russian and Saudi oil ministers — sends shockwaves through the world energy order, pushes prices up or down, and sets off tectonic shifts in global wealth and power. Each day that the Saudi-Russian spat kept oil supplies high and prices low, the big oil exporters were losing hundreds of millions of dollars and, perhaps, moving closer to financial and political disaster — while the big consuming nations enjoyed what amounted to a massive tax break. Yet in the volatile world of oil, the tide could quickly turn. A few months later, as anxieties over a second Iraq war drove prices up to forty dollars, the oil tide abruptly changed directions, transferring tens of billions of dollars from the economies of the United States, Japan, and Europe to the national banks in Riyadh, Caracas, Kuwait City, and Baghdad, and threatening to strangle whatever was left of the global economic recovery. So embedded has oil become in today's political and economic spheres that the big industrial governments now watch the oil markets as closely as they once watched the spread of communism — and with good reason: six of the last seven global recessions have been preceded by spikes in the price of oil, and fear is growing among economists and policymakers that, in today's growth-dependent, energy-intensive global economy, oil price volatility itself may eventually pose more risk to prosperity and stability and simple survival than terrorism or even war.

**Economic collapse leads to extinction**

**Kemp 10**

Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

## Terror

#### Drones effectiveness key to combat terrorism - disruption, decapitation, and destroys safe havens, specialists, and training

Byman, 13 -- Georgetown University Security Studies professor

[Daniel, Brookings Institution Saban Center for Middle East Policy Senior Fellow, "Why Drones Work," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman, accessed 8-28-13, mss]

Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration’s weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused. Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage. So drone warfare is here to stay, and it is likely to expand in the years to come as other countries’ capabilities catch up with those of the United States. But Washington must continue to improve its drone policy, spelling out clearer rules for extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings so that tyrannical regimes will have a harder time pointing to the U.S. drone program to justify attacks against political opponents. At the same time, even as it solidifies the drone program, Washington must remain mindful of the built-in limits of low-cost, unmanned interventions, since the very convenience of drone warfare risks dragging the United States into conflicts it could otherwise avoid. NOBODY DOES IT BETTER The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, since Obama has been in the White House, U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban -- top figures who are not easily replaced. In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011, that when experienced leaders are eliminated, the result is “the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders” and who are prone to errors and miscalculations. And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers. Drones have also undercut terrorists’ ability to communicate and to train new recruits. In order to avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants to “maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts” and “avoid gathering in open areas.” Leaders, however, cannot give orders when they are incommunicado, and training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an entire group of new recruits. Drones have turned al Qaeda’s command and training structures into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.

#### Drones keep terrorists on the run – they’re the only game in town

Cilluffo, 11 -- George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute director [Frank, "After bin Laden the Threat Remains: Drones, CIA and SOF Still the Only Game in Town," 5-2-11, HSPI Commentary 22, www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/commentary022\_after\_bin\_laden.cfm, accessed 8-19-13, mss]

In May 2009, just four months into his tenure as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Panetta assessed the situation this way: “Very frankly, [drone strikes are] the **only game in town** in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al Qaeda leadership.” That same year, Petraeus highlighted the imperative behind applying “a lot of pressure” while arguing that “for us, a terrorist is a terrorist, whether he operates on this side of the border or that side of the border.” Today, their assessments remain as valid (if not more so) than they were two years ago. American drone strikes, in conjunction with countless clandestine operations carried out by the CIA, US Special Forces teams (and the Pakistani military), have placed unrelenting pressure on al Qaeda, its offshoots, and fellow-travelers. Although admittedly imperfect and perhaps at times heavy-handed, these reconnaissance and strike missions have served our national interests and helped shield us from harm. In effect, these missions have provided suppressive fire against a concert of jihadi terrorists that now includes not only al Qaeda, but the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. This suppressive fire has degraded the performance of these jihadists, limiting their wherewithal to organize, plan, and carry out the large-scale mass-casualty attacks for which they yearn. Yet, suppressive fire is only effective for the duration of the fire. **Let up, and the terrorists will quickly regain** their **lost capabilities and recover the** operational **time and space** they need **to go** back **on the offensive**. Now is certainly not the time to let up. Nevertheless, strike missions are not a panacea and should not be taken lightly. For more than twenty years, the US has worked to cultivate relationships with foreign intelligence services, police, and militaries to aid in the fight against global terrorists. Although these efforts have met with limited success, they must continue. The difficult situation we face today would be far worse if we had not undertaken such — and it would quickly deteriorate if we were to walk away now. The dearth of capable, stable, and trustworthy partners in the FATA region means we will be increasingly forced to rely on these and other unconventional tools of statecraft. Islamabad remains unable to exercise the writ of government over much of its territory (or bureaucracy). Under these circumstances, history teaches us that governments also lack the ability to prevent their soil, citizens, and resources from being usurped. Thus the US must maintain its political flexibility and tactical maneuverability. The US must maintain its ability to carry out unconventional reconnaissance and paramilitary missions. This represents a critical, and increasingly important argument — for Pakistan is not an isolated case. In Yemen, in Somalia, in Sudan — and in a growing list of other un- and undergoverned nation-states we are witness to a similar pattern. In the world’s most dangerous places, the US has few partners and fewer options. At the same time, we face a continued threat from those who would do us grave harm. Under these conditions, and with the capability and moral imperative to protect our citizens, the United States must reject demands to curtail the use of drones, CIA, or Special Forces. When it comes to disrupting the activities of jihadi terrorists, these foils remain the only game in town — their value again demonstrated last night. Today, we owe a debt of gratitude to those nameless, faceless individuals who pilot the drones, collect and analyze the intelligence, and when called upon carry out the paramilitary missions. As we move forward, I hope we continue to provide them with the tools, resources, and room to maneuver necessary to do their jobs as well as they have in the last twenty-four hours.

**There’s no risk of blowback AND drones prevent worse alternatives**

Etzioni, 13 -- George Washington University international affairs professor

[Amitai, "Drones: Say it With Figures," UPI, 4-30-13, www.upi.com/Top\_News/Analysis/Outside-View/2013/04/30/Outside-View-Drones-Say-it-with-figures/UPI-25571367294880/?spt=hs&or=an, accessed 6-11-13, mss]

Drones: Say it with figures

Attacking drones, the most effective counter-terrorism tool the United States has found thus far, is a new cause celebre among progressive public intellectuals and major segments of the media. Their arguments would deserve more of a hearing if, instead of declaring their contentions as fact, they instead coughed up some evidence to support their claims. One argument that is repeated again and again is that killing terrorists with drones generates resentment from Pakistan to Yemen, thereby breeding many more terrorists than are killed. For example, Akbar Ahmed, a distinguished professor at American University, told the BBC on April 9 that, for "every terrorist drones kill, perhaps 100 rise as a result." The key word is "perhaps"; Ahmed cites no data to support his contention. Similarly, in The New York Times, Jo Becker and Scott Shane write that "Drones have replaced Guantanamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants," citing as their evidence one line Faisal Shahzad, who had tried to set off a car bomb in Times Square, used in his 2010 trial seeking to justify targeting civilians. At the same time, when HBO interviewed children who carry suicide vests, they justified their acts by the presence of foreign troops in their country and burning of Korans. No such self-serving statements can be taken as evidence in themselves. And Peter Bergen, a responsible and serious student of drones, quotes approvingly in The Washington Post a new book by Mark Mazzetti, who claims that the use of drone strikes "creates enemies just as it has obliterated them." Again, however, Mazzetti presents no evidence. One may at first consider it obvious that, when American drones kill terrorists who are members of a tribe or family, other members will resent the United States. And hence if the United States would stop targeting people from the skies, that resentment would abet and ultimately vanish. In reality, ample evidence shows that large parts of the population of several Muslim countries resent the United States for numerous and profound reasons, unrelated to drone attacks. These Muslims consider the United States to be the "Great Satan" because it violates core religious values they hold dear; it promotes secular democratic liberal regimes; it supports women's rights; and it exports a lifestyle that devout Muslims consider hedonistic and materialistic to their countries. These feelings, data show, are rampant in countries in which no drones attacks have occurred, were common in those countries in which the drones have been employed well before any attacks took place, and continue unabated, even when drone attacks are greatly scaled back. As Marc Lynch notes in Foreign Affairs: "A decade ago, anti-Americanism seemed like an urgent problem. Overseas opinion surveys showed dramatic spikes in hostility toward the United States, especially in the Arab world ... It is now clear that even major changes, such as Bush's departure, Obama's support for some of the Arab revolts of 2011, the death of Osama bin Laden, and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, have had surprisingly little effect on Arab attitudes towards the United States. Anti-Americanism might have ebbed momentarily, but it is once again flowing freely." The Pew Global Attitudes Project says anti-American sentiments were high and on the rise in countries where drone strikes weren't employed. In Jordan, for example, U.S. unfavorability rose from 78 percent in 2007 to 86 percent in 2012 while Egypt saw a rise from 78 percent to 79 percent over the same period. Notably, the percentage of respondents reporting an "unfavorable" view of the United States in these countries is as high, or higher, than in drone-targeted Pakistan. In Pakistan, a country that has been subjected to a barrage of strikes over the last five years, the United States' unfavorability held steady at 68 percent from 2007-10 (dropping briefly to 63 percent in 2008), but then began to increase, rising to 73 percent in 2011 and 80 percent in 2012 -- a two-year period in which the number of drone strikes was actually dropping significantly. It is also worth noting that these critics attribute resentment to drones rather than military strikes. Do they really think that resentment would be lower if the United States were using cruise missiles? Or bombers? Or Special Forces? If they mean that we should grant these suspected terrorists a free pass if they cannot be brought to a court in New York City to be tried, they should say so. Another frequent claim of drone opponents is that the use of drones greatly lowers the costs of war (at least for the United States) and, thus, promotes military adventurism. For example, Mazzetti (as quoted by Bergen) claims that the use of drones has "lowered the bar for waging war, and it is now easier for the United States to carry out killing operations at the ends of the earth than at any other time in its history." However, there is no evidence that the introduction of drones (and before that, high-level bombing and cruise missiles that were criticized on the same grounds) made going to war more likely or its extension more acceptable. On the contrary, anybody who followed the American disengagement in Vietnam after the introduction of high-level bombing (which was subject to criticism similar to that of drones) or the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan -- despite the considerable increase in the use of drone strikes elsewhere -- knows better. In effect, the opposite argument may well hold: If the United States couldn't draw on drones in Yemen and the other new theaters of the counterterrorism campaign, the nation might well have been forced to rely more on conventional troops, a choice that would greatly increase our casualties as well as the resentment by the locals, who particularly object to the presence of foreign troops.

**On the ground interviews prove recruitment’s inevitable – people join AQAP because they need the cash**

Swift, 12 -- Georgetown University National Security Studies professor

[Christopher, University of Virginia's Center for National Security Law fellow, J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center, Ph.D. in Politics and International Studies from the University of Cambridge, "The Drone Blowback Fallacy," Foreign Affairs, 7-1-12, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137760/christopher-swift/the-drone-blowback-fallacy?page=show, accessed 6-14-13, mss]

Last month, I traveled to Yemen to study how AQAP operates and whether the conventional understanding of the relationship between drones and recruitment is correct. While there, I conducted 40 interviews with tribal leaders, Islamist politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources. These subjects came from 14 of Yemen's 21 provinces, most from rural regions. Many faced insurgent infiltration in their own districts. Some of them were actively fighting AQAP. Two had recently visited terrorist strongholds in Jaar and Zinjibar as guests. I conducted each of these in-depth interviews using structured questions and a skilled interpreter. I have withheld my subjects' names to protect their safety -- a necessity occasioned by the fact that some of them had survived assassination attempts and that others had recently received death threats. These men had little in common with the Yemeni youth activists who capture headlines and inspire international acclaim. As a group, they were older, more conservative, and more skeptical of U.S. motives. They were less urban, less wealthy, and substantially less secular. But to my astonishment, none of the individuals I interviewed drew a causal relationship between U.S. drone strikes and al Qaeda recruiting. Indeed, of the 40 men in this cohort, only five believed that U.S. drone strikes were helping al Qaeda more than they were hurting it. Al Qaeda exploits U.S. errors, to be sure. As the Yemen scholar Gregory Johnsen correctly observes, the death of some 40 civilians in the December 2009 cruise missile strike on Majala infuriated ordinary Yemenis and gave AQAP an unexpected propaganda coup. But the fury produced by such tragedies is not systemic, not sustained, and, ultimately, not sufficient. As much as al Qaeda might play up civilian casualties and U.S. intervention in its recruiting videos, the Yemeni tribal leaders I spoke to reported that the factors driving young men into the insurgency are overwhelmingly economic. From al Hudaydah in the west to Hadhramaut in the east, AQAP is building complex webs of dependency within Yemen's rural population. It gives idle teenagers cars, khat, and rifles -- the symbols of Yemeni manhood. It pays salaries (up to $400 per month) that lift families out of poverty. It supports weak and marginalized sheikhs by digging wells, distributing patronage to tribesmen, and punishing local criminals. As the leader of one Yemeni tribal confederation told me, "Al Qaeda attracts those who can't afford to turn away." Religious figures echoed these words. Though critical of the U.S. drone campaign, none of the Islamists and Salafists I interviewed believed that drone strikes explain al Qaeda's burgeoning numbers. "The driving issue is development," an Islamist parliamentarian from Hadramout province said. "Some districts are so poor that joining al Qaeda represents the best of several bad options." (Other options include criminality, migration, and even starvation.) A Salafi scholar engaged in hostage negotiations with AQAP agreed. "Those who fight do so because of the injustice in this country," he explained. "A few in the north are driven by ideology, but in the south it is mostly about poverty and corruption." Despite Yemenis' antipathy toward drones, my conversations also revealed a surprising degree of pragmatism. Those living in active conflict zones drew clear distinctions between earlier U.S. operations, such as the Majala bombing, and more recent strikes on senior al Qaeda figures. "Things were very bad in 2009," a tribal militia commander from Abyan province told me, "but now the drones are seen as helping us." He explained that Yemenis could "accept [drones] as long as there are no more civilian casualties." An Islamist member of the separatist al-Harak movement offered a similar assessment. "Ordinary people have become very practical about drones," he said. "If the United States focuses on the leaders and civilians aren't killed, then drone strikes will hurt al Qaeda more than they help them." Some of the men I interviewed admitted that they had changed their minds about drone strikes. Separatists in Aden who openly derided AQAP as a proxy of Yemen's recently deposed president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, privately acknowledged the utility of the U.S. drone campaign. "Saleh created this crisis in order to steal from America and stay in power," a former official from the now-defunct People's Democratic Republic of Yemen told me. "Now it is our crisis, and we need every tool to solve it." Yemeni journalists, particularly those with firsthand exposure to AQAP, shared this view: "I opposed the drone campaign until I saw what al Qaeda was doing in Jaar and Zinjibar," an independent reporter in Aden said. "Al Qaeda hates the drones, they're absolutely terrified of the drones ... and that is why we need them."

#### Terrorism goes nuclear - highest probability impact

Neely ’13 (Meggaen Neely, CSIS, “Doubting Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism”, <http://csis.org/blog/doubting-deterrence-nuclear-terrorism?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+csis-poni+%28PONI+Debates+the+Issues+Blog%29>, March 21, 2013)

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) cites nuclear terrorism as “today’s most immediate and extreme danger.” To counter this danger, the NPR lists research initiatives, securing nuclear materials, and a “commitment to hold fully accountable” any who help terrorists obtain nuclear weapons. Matthew Kroenig and Barry Pavel, the self-described authors of U.S. strategy for deterring terrorist networks, explain further how the United States can discourage terrorists from detonating a nuclear weapon. They make useful distinctions between actors in terrorist organizations, which can have implications for U.S. policies. However, the United States should not rely exclusively on deterrence – that is, those policies that attempt to discourage terrorists from detonating a nuclear weapon. Complementary policies that may be more effective will focus on securing nuclear materials and implementing defensive measures, in addition to conventional counterterrorism strategies. Although this shift will not make the task of preventing nuclear terrorism easier, recognizing the limits of deterrence policies will allow the United States to make smarter choices in defending against nuclear terrorism. Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism The risk that terrorists will set off a nuclear weapon on U.S. soil is disconcertingly high. While a terrorist organization may experience difficulty constructing nuclear weapons facilities, there is significant concern that terrorists can obtain a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials. The fear that an actor could steal a nuclear weapon or fissile material and transport it to the United States has long-existed. It takes a great amount of time and resources (including territory) to construct centrifuges and reactors to build a nuclear weapon from scratch. Relatively easily-transportable nuclear weapons, however, present one opportunity to terrorists. For example, exercises similar to the recent Russian movement of nuclear weapons from munitions depots to storage sites may prove attractive targets. Loose nuclear materials pose a second opportunity. Terrorists could use them to create a crude nuclear weapon similar to the gun-type design of Little Boy. Its simplicity – two subcritical masses of highly-enriched uranium – may make it attractive to terrorists. While such a weapon might not produce the immediate destruction seen at Hiroshima, the radioactive fall-out and psychological effects would still be damaging. These two opportunities for terrorists differ from concerns about a “dirty bomb,” which mixes radioactive material with conventional explosives. According to Gary Ackerman of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, the number of terrorist organizations that would detonate a nuclear weapon is probably small. Few terrorist organizations have the ideology that would motivate nuclear weapons acquisition. Before we breathe a sigh of relief, we should recognize that this only increases the “signal-to-noise ratio”: many terrorists might claim to want to detonate a nuclear weapon, but the United States must find and prevent the small number of groups that actually would. Transportable nuclear weapons and loose fissile materials grant opportunities to terrorists with nuclear pursuits. How should the United States seek to undercut the efforts of the select few with a nuclear intent? The Problems with Deterrence The answer for U.S. policy is not deterrence. Deterrence involves convincing an adversary that the costs imposed upon him after taking an action will outweigh any benefits gained. It requires altering the strategic calculus (i.e. the analysis of costs and benefits for taking a particular action) of the adversary. These costs come from either punishment imposed on the adversary or from denying the adversary the expected benefits. In execution, deterrence requires policies of consistency and conditionality towards an adversary: consistency in expressing the imposition of costs or denied benefits if the adversary takes a specific action and conditionality in that the possibility of retaliation depends upon the adversary’s decision to take the undesirable action. These requirements of consistency and conditionality cannot be applied to a transnational threat like nuclear terrorism. Terrorists operate across states’ borders, but the burden remains on states to implement deterrence laws and policies that impose costs or deny benefits. One could point to the “glorification” laws in the United Kingdom, which sought to deter suicide terrorism by criminalizing the praise of martyrdom, as an example of such a policy. However, not all countries are able or willing to implement such laws. Alternatively, even countries that are able and willing may hesitate for fear of violating international or domestic norms. For example, with the “glorification” laws, many accused British policymakers of infringing on the right to free speech. Deterrence requires consistency in the communication of certain retaliation should the adversary take an undesired action. In the aggregate, states’ policies will likely lack this consistency and conditionality required for deterring nuclear terrorism. This results in confusion and a lack of credibility for the threat of imposing costs or denying benefits. Of course, terrorists are not susceptible to more “traditional” forms of deterrence like holding territory at risk (given that they do not own territory) or by threatening suicide terrorists with physical harm.

#### That causes extinction - retaliation

Ayson 10 - Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, July. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7. InformaWorld.)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability.

## Solvency

#### The United States Congress should revise Public Law 107-40 to set forth criteria that prohibits the Presidential use of drone strikes against new terrorist threats where the President has not undergone administrative review to identify particular groups covered.

**Domestic and international backlash to status quo drone policy causes rollback now – reforming drone policy solves legitimacy which is key to basing rights and continued drone use**

**Zenko 13**, Micah, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January 2013, Council Special Report No. 65

Over the past decade, the use of unmanned aerial systems—commonly referred to as drones—by the U.S. government has expanded exponentially in scope, location, and frequency. From September 2001 to April 2012, the U.S. military increased its drone inventory from ﬁfty to seventy-ﬁve hundred—of which approximately 5 percent can be armed. Yet despite the unprecedented escalation of its ﬂeet and missions, the U.S. government has not provided a clear explanation of how drone strikes in nonbattleﬁeld settings are coordinated with broader foreign policy objectives, the scope of legitimate targets, and the legal framework. Drones are critical counterterrorism tools that advance U.S. interests around the globe, but this lack of transparency threatens to limit U.S. freedom of action and risks proliferation of armed drone technology without the requisite normative framework. Existing practices carry two major risks for U.S. interests that are likely to grow over time. The ﬁrst comes from operational restrictions on drones due to domestic and international pressure. In the United States, the public and policymakers are increasingly uneasy with limited transparency for targeted killings. If the present trajectory continues, drones may share the fate of Bush-era enhanced interrogation techniques and warrantless wiretapping—the unpopularity and illegality of which eventually caused the policy’s demise. Internationally, objections from host states and other counterterrorism partners could also severely circumscribe drones’ effectiveness. Host states have grown frustrated with U.S. drone policy, while opposition by nonhost partners could impose additional restrictions on the use of drones. Reforming U.S. drone strike policies can do much to allay concerns internationally by ensuring that targeted killings are defensible under international legal regimes that the United States itself helped establish, and by allowing U.S. officials to openly address concerns and counter misinformation. The second major risk is that of proliferation. Over the next decade, the U.S. near-monopoly on drone strikes will erode as more countries develop and hone this capability. The advantages and effectiveness of drones in attacking hard-to-reach and time-sensitive targets are compelling many countries to indigenously develop or explore purchasing unmanned aerial systems. In this uncharted territory, U.S. policy pro- vides a powerful precedent for other states and nonstate actors that will increasingly deploy drones with potentially dangerous ramiﬁcations. Reforming its practices could allow the United States to regain moral authority in dealings with other states and credibly engage with the international community to shape norms for responsible drone use. The current trajectory of U.S. drone strike policies is unsustainable. Without reform from within, drones risk becoming an unregulated, unaccountable vehicle for states to deploy lethal force with impunity. Consequently, the United States should more fully explain and reform aspects of its policies on drone strikes in nonbattleﬁeld settings by ending the controversial practice of “signature strikes”; limiting targeted killings to leaders of transnational terrorist organizations and individuals with direct involvement in past or ongoing plots against the United States and its allies; and clarifying rules of the road for drone strikes in nonbattleﬁeld settings. Given that the United States is currently the only country—other than the United Kingdom in the tra- ditional battleﬁeld of Afghanistan and perhaps Israel—to use drones to attack the sovereign territory of another country, it has a unique opportunity and responsibility to engage relevant international actors and shape development of a normative framework for acceptable use of drones. Although reforming U.S. drone strike policies will be difficult and will require sustained high-level attention to balance transparency with the need to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods, it would serve U.S. national interests by ■allowing policymakers and diplomats to paint a more accurate portrayal of drones to counter the myths and misperceptions that currently remain unaddressed due to secrecy concerns; ■placing the use of drones as a counterterrorism tactic on a more legitimate and defensible footing with domestic and international audiences; increasing the likelihood that the United States will sustain the inter- national tolerance and cooperation required to carry out future drone strikes, such as intelligence support and host-state basing rights; ■exerting a normative inﬂuence on the policies and actions of other states; and ■providing current and future U.S. administrations with the requisite political leverage to shape and promote responsible use of drones by other states and nonstate actors.

#### Presidential use of drone strikes is on its last straw, reform of the AUMF stops court strikedown

**Barnes 13** [Beau, International Parliamentary Fellow as staff to a congressional candidate for the Mercy Corps, honor graduate of Lewis and Clark College where he focused on National Security Law and Policy/International Law, joint-degree student at Boston University Law School and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where he focuses on national security law and policy, “The War On Terror Has Changed – Now The Rules Should, Too,” 5-16 <http://cognoscenti.wbur.org/2013/05/16/authorization-for-use-of-military-force-beau-barnes>]

The law that forms the foundation of the war on terror is almost obsolete, undermining the legal basis of U.S. counterterrorism operations. On Thursday, the Senate Armed Services Committee will take a long-overdue first step to fix this problem, a development we should all applaud.¶ On September 14, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), authorizing “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons” behind the 9/11 attacks. Over a decade later, al-Qaida, the group that perpetrated the attacks, is on the ropes. But other armed groups – like the Haqqani Network, al-Shabab, and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb – have become targets of the Obama administration’s worldwide counterterrorism efforts. The statute’s explicit reference to the 9/11 attacks, however, means it can’t authorize military action against groups with only superficial links to al-Qaida. In the wake of 9/11, the AUMF provided legal authority and demonstrated congressional support for the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. But the Bush administration soon abandoned the AUMF, justifying the war on terror on the basis of the president’s inherent constitutional powers as commander-in-chief. These interpretations were soon discredited, both in the court of public opinion and in actual courts, with the Supreme Court repeatedly chastising the Bush administration’s legal approach to counterterrorism.¶ In a laudable attempt to bring U.S. counterterrorism policy back within the rule of law, the Obama administration has invoked the AUMF as the basis for its global “targeted killing” operations, known by most simply as “drone strikes.” But, like its predecessor, this administration has also stretched the law to serve its purposes, and is currently contemplating even more implausible interpretations of the AUMF. The president and his legal team are pushing us closer to a place where every terrorist is a member of al-Qaida.¶ How we justify counterterrorism operations is not just a question for the lawyers – it’s a policy choice with far-reaching domestic and international implications. Military might and covert operations alone can’t win the global struggle against al-Qaida and its ideological comrades-in-arms. We need credible arguments too, both to secure support from potential partners and undermine extremist justifications. As former Defense Department general counsel Jeh Johnson argued, “we must guard against aggressive interpretations of our authorities that will discredit our efforts, provoke controversy and invite challenge.” The administration has already read nearly all meaning out of the legal concepts of “imminence” and “hostilities” — another far-fetched legal interpretation might be the last straw for the administration’s legitimacy in the arena of counterterrorism. Alternatives to the AUMF exist, but they’re not good. Relying on inherent presidential power runs into considerable legal and political difficulties. Legally, this approach would risk intervention by a Supreme Court with a willingness to strike down excessive claims of executive power. Politically, it would be difficult to sustain for a president who ran for office largely on the promise of repudiating Bush-era legal excesses.¶ A rationale base d on the international law of self-defense is similarly unappealing. Although the Obama administration maintains that the AUMF “does not authorize military force against anyone the Executive labels a ‘terrorist,’” using this legal argument would lead to precisely that result, usurping Congress’s constitutionally provided role in national security policy. Since the United States plays an important role in setting norms of international conduct, our government should not claim legal rights that it is not prepared to see proliferate around the globe. UN officials recognize that the Obama administration’s “expansive and open-ended interpretation of the right to self-defense threatens to destroy the prohibition on the use of armed force.” CIA director John Brennan noted in 2012 that U.S. drone strikes “are establishing precedents that other nations may follow” – a concern that is already materializing.¶ With international armed groups unlikely to disappear any time soon, one option rises above the rest: it’s time for a new AUMF. President Obama is understandably reluctant to legally entrench President Bush’s war on terror, but a properly drafted law could provide legitimacy to existing operations and constrain future presidents. Indeed, our concern shouldn’t be a new counterterrorism statute, but what happens in its absence.¶ A new AUMF should not provide a blanket authorization to kill anyone the president considers an enemy. Instead, it should create a framework for continued counterterrorism operations that addresses which groups are valid targets, the circumstances under which they can be targeted, and where such operations can occur. Unlike the current AUMF, a new law should include an expiration date, but not be legally tied to any specific event

#### Emerging extra-AUMF threats make the AUMF obsolete now – reform is key to overall US CT strategy

**Chesney et al 13** <Benjamin Wittes is a senior fellow in governance studies at the Brookings Institution and codirector of the Harvard Law School–Brookings Project on Law and Security. Matthew Waxman is a professor of law at Columbia Law School and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He previously served as principal deputy director of policy planning (2005–7) and acting director of policy planning (2007) at the US Department of State. He also served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for detainee affairs (2004–5), director for contingency planning and international justice at the National Security Council (2002–3), and special assistant to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (2001–2). He is a graduate of Yale College and Yale Law School. Jack Goldsmith is the Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law at Harvard University. Former assistant attorney general, Office of Legal Counsel, Goldsmith holds a JD from Yale Law School, a BA and an MA from Oxford University. Robert Chesney is a professor at the University of Texas School of Law, a nonresident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution, and a distinguished scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. “Is the "War on Terror" Lawful?” February 25, 2013. http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/141091>

Since September 18, 2001, a joint resolution of Congress known as the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) has served as the primary legal foundation for the “war on terror.” In this essay we explain why the AUMF is increasingly obsolete, why the nation will probably need a new legal foundation for next-generation terrorist threats, what the options are for this new legal foundation, and which option we think is best. ¶ The AUMF authorizes the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, . . . .” The authorization of “force” in the AUMF is the main legal basis for the president’s power to detain and target members of al Qaeda and The Taliban. In addition, since September 11, Congress, two presidential administrations, and the lower federal courts have interpreted the “force” authorized by the AUMF to extend to members or substantial supporters of the Taliban and al Qaeda, and associated forces.¶ The main reason the AUMF is becoming obsolete is that the conflict it describes – which on its face is one against the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks and those who harbor them – is growing less salient as U.S. and allied actions degrade the core of Al Qaeda and the U.S. military draws down its forces fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. At the same time that the original objects of the AUMF are dying off, newer terrorist groups that threaten the United States and its interests are emerging around the globe. Some of the terrorist groups have substantial ties to al Qaeda and thus can be brought within the AUMF by interpretation.¶ For example, the President has been able to use force against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”), a terrorist organization in Yemen, because it is a supporter or associated force of al Qaeda. But this interpretive move is increasingly difficult as newer threatening groups emerge with dimmer ties, if any, to al Qaeda. As a result, we are reaching the end point of statutory authority for the President to meet terrorist threats.¶ We should emphasize at the outset that we do not claim that the increasingly obsolete AUMF demands immediate amendment or alteration. We do not make this claim because we lack access to classified information that would indicate the full nature of the terrorist threats the nation faces, or their connection to al Qaeda, or the nation’s ability to meet the threat given current legal authorities.¶ We also recognize that any new force authorizations carry significant strategic and political consequences beyond their immediate operational consequences. We nonetheless believe strongly – based on public materials and conversations with government officials – that the AUMF’s usefulness is running out, and that this trend will continue and will demand attention, in the medium term if not in the short term. Our aim is to contribute to the conversation the nation will one day have about a renewed AUMF by explaining why we think one will be necessary and the possible shape it might take.¶ Part I of this paper explains in more detail why the AUMF is becoming obsolete and argues that the nation needs a new legal foundation for next-generation terrorist threats. Part II then describes the basic options for this new legal foundation, ranging from the President’s Article II powers alone to a variety of statutory approaches, and discusses the pros and cons of each option, and the one we prefer. Part III analyzes additional factors Congress should consider in any such framework.¶ I. ¶ The Growing Problem of Extra-AUMF Threats and the Need for a New Statutory Framework¶ In this Part we explain why the AUMF is growing obsolete and why a combination of law enforcement and Article II authorities, standing alone, is not an adequate substitute.¶ 1. The Growing Obsolescence of the AUMF¶ The September 2001 AUMF provides for the use of force against the entity responsible for the 9/11 attacks, as well as those harboring that entity. It has been clear from the beginning that the AUMF encompasses al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, respectively. This was the right focus in late 2001, and for a considerable period thereafter. But for three reasons, this focus is increasingly mismatched to the threat environment facing the United States. ¶ First, the original al Qaeda network has been substantially degraded by the success of the United States and its allies in killing or capturing the network’s leaders and key personnel. That is not to say that al Qaeda no longer poses a significant threat to the United States, of course. The information available in the public record suggests that it does, and thus nothing we say below should be read to suggest that force is no longer needed to address the threat al Qaeda poses. Our point is simply that the original al Qaeda network is no longer the preeminent operational threat to the homeland that it once was.¶ Second, the Afghan Taliban are growing increasingly marginal to the AUMF. As noted above, the AUMF extended to the Taliban because of the safe harbor they provided to al Qaeda. That rationale makes far less sense a dozen years later, with the remnants of al Qaeda long-since relocated to Pakistan’s FATA region. This issue has gone largely unremarked in the interim because U.S. and coalition forces all along have been locked in hostilities with the Afghan Taliban, and thus no occasion to reassess the AUMF nexus has ever arisen.¶ Such an occasion may well loom on the horizon, however, as the United States draws down in Afghanistan with increasing rapidity. To be sure, the United State no doubt will continue to support the Afghan government in its efforts to tamp down insurgency, and it also will likely continue to mount counterterrorism operations within Afghanistan. It may even be the case that at some future point, the Taliban will again provide safe harbor to what remains of al Qaeda, thereby at least arguably reviving their AUMF nexus. But for the time being, the days of direct combat engagement with the Afghan Taliban appear to be numbered. ¶ If the decline of the original al Qaeda network and the decline of U.S. interest in the Afghan Taliban were the only considerations, one might applaud rather than fret over the declining relevance of the AUMF. There is, however, a third consideration: significant new threats are emerging, ones that are not easily shoehorned into the current AUMF framework.¶ To a considerable extent, the new threats stem from the fragmentation of al Qaeda itself. In this sense, the problem with the original AUMF is not so much that its primary focus is on al Qaeda, but rather that it is increasingly difficult to determine with clarity which groups and individuals in al Qaeda’s orbit are sufficiently tied to the core so as to fall within the AUMF. And given the gravity of the threat that some of these groups and individuals may pose on an independent basis, it also is increasingly odd to premise the legal framework for using force against them on a chain of reasoning that requires a detour through the original, core al Qaeda organi zation.¶ ¶ The fragmentation process has several elements. First, entities that at least arguably originated as mere regional cells of the core network have established a substantial degree of organizational and operational independence, even while maintaining some degree of correspondence with al Qaeda’s leaders. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a good example. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) arguably fits this description as well, though in that case one might point to a substantial degree of strategic independence as well.¶ Second, entities that originated as independent, indigenous organizations have to varying degrees established formal ties to al Qaeda, often rebranding themselves in the process. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), formerly known as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, illustrates this path. Al Shabaab in Somalia arguably does as well. And then there are circumstances (such as the ones currently unfolding in Mali, Libya, and Syria) in which it is not entirely clear where the organizational lines lie among (i) armed groups that work in concert with or even at the direction of one of the aforementioned al Qaeda affiliates; (ii) armed groups that are sympathetic and in communication with al Qaeda; and (iii) armed groups that are wholly-independent of al Qaeda yet also stem from the same larger milieu of Salafist extremists.¶ This situation – which one of us has described as the emergence of “extra-AUMF” threats – poses a significant problem insofar as counterterrorism policy rests on the AUMF for its legal justification. In some circumstances it remains easy to make the case for a nexus to the original al Qaeda network and hence to the AUMF. But in a growing number of circumstances, drawing the requisite connection to the AUMF requires an increasingly complex daisy chain of associations – a task that is likely to be very difficult (and hence subject to debate) in some cases, and downright impossible in others.¶ The emergence of this problem should come as no surprise. It has been nearly a dozen years since the AUMF’s passage, and circumstances have evolved considerably since then. It was inevitable that threats would emerge that might not fit easily or at all within its scope. The question is whether Congress should do anything about this situation, and if so precisely what.

#### The plan allows the president to address extra-AUMF threats and identification ensures accountability

**Chesney et al 13** <Benjamin Wittes is a senior fellow in governance studies at the Brookings Institution and codirector of the Harvard Law School–Brookings Project on Law and Security. Matthew Waxman is a professor of law at Columbia Law School and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He previously served as principal deputy director of policy planning (2005–7) and acting director of policy planning (2007) at the US Department of State. He also served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for detainee affairs (2004–5), director for contingency planning and international justice at the National Security Council (2002–3), and special assistant to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (2001–2). He is a graduate of Yale College and Yale Law School. Jack Goldsmith is the Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law at Harvard University. Former assistant attorney general, Office of Legal Counsel, Goldsmith holds a JD from Yale Law School, a BA and an MA from Oxford University. Robert Chesney is a professor at the University of Texas School of Law, a nonresident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution, and a distinguished scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. “Is the "War on Terror" Lawful?” February 25, 2013. http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/141091>

Based on current trends and the lessons from the past decade, we recommend a third approach: Congress sets forth general statutory criteria for presidential uses of force against new terrorist threats but requires the executive branch, through a robust administrative process, to identify particular groups that are covered by that authorization of force. One model to draw on, with modifications, is the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization designation process.¶ Under this process, the Secretary of State – pursuant to specific statutory standards, in consultation with other Departments, and following a notification period to Congress – designates particular groups as terrorist organizations and thereby triggers statutory consequences for those groups and their members. We believe that a listing system modeled on this approach best cabins presidential power while at the same time giving the President the flexibility he needs to address emerging threats. Such a listing scheme will also render more transparent and regularized the now very murky process by which organizations and their members are deemed to fall within the September 2001 AUMF. ¶ The listing is approach is not without significant challenges, however. Some will claim that such a delegation to the president to identify the entities against whom force can be deployed would be unconstitutional. However, Congress has often authorized the president to use force in ways that leave the president significant discretion in determining the precise enemy. In light of this history, the waning of the non-delegation doctrine in other contexts, the congressional specification of the general criteria for the use of force, and the administrative, reporting, and timing limitations on the listing process described below, the constitutional objections can be overcome.¶ A more serious challenge is that the listing approach will appear to codify permanent war, and to diminish the degree of congressional involvement and inter-branch deliberation compared to the second approach. These concerns can be mitigated in several ways. First, the substantive statutory criteria governing this listing process should be as specific as possible. For example, a new AUMF might authorize force against “an organization with sufficient capability and planning that it presents an imminent threat to the United States.” Or it might authorize force against “any group or person that has committed a belligerent act against the U.S. or imminently threatens to do so.”¶ In setting out such criteria, Congress could make clear precisely what it means by key terms such as “imminent” and “belligerent act.” The criteria should, moreover, be expressly linked to international self-defense law. Compliance with that law is an obligation of the United States. And from a diplomatic and international legal-policy standpoint it is important that the United States government as a whole make clear that this is not an open-ended “global war on terror” but a cabined application of traditional self-defense to the new realities of non-state threats.¶ Second, at the front-end of the listing process, the administrative, consultative, and notification procedures should be sufficiently robust to ensure careful deliberation and strong accountability. At the same time, the statute should provide for emergency exercises of Article II power (which the Constitution arguably compels in any event), followed by a process for retroactive listing, to deal with rapidly-moving crises while providing strong incentive for the President to fold his actions into the statutory scheme.¶ Finally, a listing scheme should include thorough ex post reporting and auditing as well. At a minimum the President should have a duty to report to Congress in detail on the intelligence and other factual bases that led to the inclusion of particular groups on the list. The President should also have a duty to file detailed reports with Congress -- in a more robust form than the usually conclusory War Powers Resolution reports -- about how the statutory authorization of force is being implemented.

The Aff is Necessary to Productively Use U.S. Power - The Alternative Ensures Mass Slaughter

Reus-Smit ‘4 (Christian Reus-Smit, Prof. of IR at Australian National University, ‘2004 *American Power and World Order* p. 109-115)

The second, frequently invoked, ethical position is that hegemony is justified if the dominant state **provides international public goods.** These are goods that all members of international society can 'consume' or benefit from, irrespective of whether they, as individual states, have helped bear the costs of their provision .7 Commonly cited examples are a stable balance of power, freedom of the high seas and open international markets. One version of this position is articulated by pluralist international society theorists. Hedley Bull argued that states share three elementary goals of social life: that they will be secure against violence, that promises will be kept and that their territorial property rights will be respected. Only when these elementary goals are sustained can we say that international order exists. But how can these be sustained in a world without central authority? Bull identifies several sources of international order - including international law, diplomacy and even war - but he also stresses the special role of great powers. If states were all equal in power, Bull wondered how 'international conflicts could **ever be settled** and laid to rest, or the claims of any one state definitely granted or denied'.8 The existence of great powers, however, allows the establishment of a **modicum of order**. 'Great powers contribute to international order in two main ways: by managing their relations with one another; and by exploiting their preponderance in such a way as to impart a degree of central direction to the affairs of international society as a whole.'9 Bull denied that a great power-sponsored order could ever be perfectly just, but he clearly saw this order, and the role of great powers in sustaining it, as ethically justifiable. Order was, in Bull's mind, a prerequisite for justice, and he thus held that 'order is desirable, or valuable in human affairs, and afortiori in world politics'. 10 Another version of the public goods argument is articulated by hegemonic stability theorists. Behind this version lies a simple proposition drawn from economic theory: 'even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest'." In the context of international relations, this means that even if states would all benefit from the provision of certain public goods, they may not voluntarily act to realize those goods. The reason for this is that 'individuals are likely to calculate that they are better off by not contributing, since their contribution is costly to them but has an imperceptible effect on whether the good is produced'. 12 If all states think like this, then the public goods in question will never be provided. That is, unless a hegemonic state is prepared to bear the costs of providing such goods. Hegemonic stability theorists claim that hegemons have strong incentives to do this, as they stand to gain most from geo-political stability, open markets, etc. Certainly the actions of Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States after the Second World War bear this out, as both helped provide significant public goods for international society. **The inter-war period**, in contrast, **is** often cited as **evidence of the disorder** that can result when there is no hegemonic power to sustain international order; the lack of a leading state to manage the world economy, for example, is seen as a principal cause of the Great Depression.' 3 From this perspective, therefore, the exercise of hegemonic power can be justified if it delivers international public goods. Nye argues that American foreign policy should be redirected to the provision of such goods, partly because it would serve America's national interests, and partly because it would bolster its international legitimacy. 14 Advocates of this position rarely use explicit ethical language, but any justification that ties the provision of social goods to legitimacy is inescapably normative in nature and intent. The third possible ethical position holds that might is right if it **furthers cosmopolitan ends**, such as promoting international human rights or **facilitating global distributive justice**. A hegemon is to be judged not on the basis of whether it provides order among sovereign states - or at least not primarily - but with regard to its success or failure in protecting the rights and satisfying the needs of individual human beings. Surprisingly, there are few wellelaborated statements of this position, despite the fact that it is implied in many critiques of American foreign policy, today and in the past. Henry Shue's classic work Basic Rights comes close to such a statement, making the case as it does that American foreign policy ought to prioritize the promotion of certain 'subsistence rights'. But Shue stops short of arguing that American hegemony would be justified by the provision of such rights, even if he might believe this. 15 We are left, therefore, to anticipate the main contours of such an argument. Given the general principles of cosmopolitan thought, four interrelated ideas seem relevant. First, individuals not states are the proper locus of ethical concern. Second, institutions of power are only justified if they uphold the rights and fulfil the needs of said individuals. Third, because the world is practically interdependent, it is morally interdependent as well. And finally, hegemony, as an institution of power, is justified only if it helps to defend the rights and satisfy the needs of individuals living in this morally interdependent world. This final idea might have negative and positive dimensions. An ethically defensible hegemon would have to refrain from violating individuals' rights or compromising their needs, but it would also be obliged, given the reach of its power and the benefits it gains from such reach, to be proactive when states or markets fail. The fourth ethical defence of hegemony draws on traditional liberal political values. Both the second and third of our justifications invoked liberal themes, such as the ideas that political institutions are legitimate if they provide public goods or uphold the rights of individuals. A number of authors have gone further, though, in articulating an explicit liberal justification for the exercise of dominant state power. A case in point is Lea Brilmayer's American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One-Superpower World. Brilmayer argues that hegemony must be seen as a form of governance, a political institution that ought to be judged on the same basis as domestic political institutions. This is not only because a hegemon sits at the apex of a hierarchy of power, just as the state does, but because like the state a hegemon provides public goods. It follows, therefore, that 'it should be evaluated as though the hegemon were a world government of comparable capacities and engaged in comparable activities'.16 As a liberal, Brilmayer believes that such an evaluation should be based on two principles common to all liberal theories. 'The first is the emphasis on democratic participation, with governance resting on some form of popular consent. The second is the protection of a particular set of substantive human rights from oppression even by majorities. 17 Most of Brilmayer's book is devoted to addressing the myriad of problems raised by trying to apply the first of these standards to power in international relations. The concept of consent has always been a bugbear for liberal political theorists, and its problems are only amplified in international relations. Is it states or individuals that need to consent to hegemony? Is consent needed for all hegemonic acts, or only for hegemonic rule in general? Under what conditions should consent be seen as freely given? Is bribery-induced consent genuine? Does tacit consent count, and if so, how does one know when it has been given? Brilmayer's answers to these questions are more statist than cosmopolitan. The exercise of hegemonic power is ethically justifiable if it rests on the consent of weaker states, but to ensure that these states truly represent the interests of their peoples, the hegemon itself must assess those interests. 'This means, in practice, that the interests of people in other states (as best we guess them) must be a check on our agreements with their governments. "8 The final ethical position - the polar opposite of the first - holds that the exercise of hegemonic power is never ethically justifiable. One source of such a position might be pacifist thought, which abhors the use of violence even in unambiguous cases of self-defence. This **would not**, however, provide a comprehensive critique of the exercise of hegemonic power, **which takes forms other than** overt **violence**, such as economic diplomacy or the manipulation of international institutions. A more likely source of such critique would be the multifarious literature that equates all power with domination. Postmodernists (and anarchists, for that matter) might argue that behind all power lies self-interest and a will to control, both of which are antithetical to genuine human freedom and diversity. Radical liberals might contend that the exercise of power by one human over another transforms the latter from a moral agent into a moral subject, thus violating their integrity as self-governing individuals. Whatever the source, these ideas lead to radical scepticism about all institutions of power, of which hegemony is one form. The idea that the state is a source of individual security is replaced here with the idea of the state as a tyranny; the idea of hegemony as essential to the provision of global public goods is replaced with the idea of dominant power is inimical to the human good. Which of the above ideas help us to evaluate the ethics of the BushAdministration's revisionist hegemonic project? There is a strong temptation in international relations scholarship to mount trenchant defences of favoured paradigms, to show that the core assumptions of one's preferred theory can be adapted to answer an ever widening set of big and important questions. There is a certain discipline of mind that this cultivates, and it certainly brings some order to theoretical debates, but it can lead to the 'Cinderella syndrome', the squeezing of an ungainly, over-complicated world into an undersized theoretical glass slipper. The study of international ethics is not immune this syndrome, with a long line of scholars seeking master normative principles of universal applicability. My approach here is a less ambitious, more **pragmatic** one. With the exceptions of the first and last positions, each of the above ethical perspectives contains kernels of wisdom. The challenge is to identify those of value for evaluating the ethics of Bush's revisionist grand strategy, and to consider how they might stand in order of priority. The following discussion takes up this challenge and arrives at a position that I tentatively term 'procedural solidarism'. The first and last of our five ethical positions can be dismissed as unhelpful to our task. The idea that might is right resonates with the cynical attitude we often feel towards the darker aspects of international relations, but it does not constitute an ethical standpoint from which to judge the exercise of hegemonic power. First of all, it places the right of moral judgement in the hands of the hegemon, and leaves all of those subject to its actions with no grounds for ethical critique. What the hegemon dictates as ethical is ethical. More than this, though, the principle that might is right is undiscriminating. It gives us no resources to determine ethical from unethical hegemonic conduct. The idea that might is never right is equally **unsatisfying**. It is a principle implied in many critiques of imperial power, including of American power. But like its polar opposite**, it is utterly undiscriminating**. No matter what the hegemon does we are left with **one blanket assessment**. No procedure, no selfless goal is worthy of ethical endorsement. **This is a deeply impoverished** **ethical posture**, as it raises the critique of power above all other human values. It is also completely counter-intuitive. Had the United States intervened militarily to prevent the Rwandan genocide, would this not have been ethically justifiable? If one answers no, then one faces the difficult task of explaining why the exercise of hegemonic power would have been a greater evil than allowing almost **a million people to be massacred**. If one answers yes, then one is admitting that a more discriminating set of ethical principles is
needed than the simple yet enticing proposition that might is never right.

**Alt fails and can’t eliminate the negative aspects of heg- we can redeploy heg instead of rejecting it**

**Thompson ‘3** (Iraq, Hegemony and the Question of American Empire by Michael J. Thompson, Michael J. Thompson is the founder and editor of Logos and teaches political theory at Hunter College, CUNY. His new book, Islam and the West: Critical Perspectives on Modernity has just been released from Rowman and Littlefield Press.

It is rare that political debates typically confined to the left will burst into the mainstream with any degree of interest, let alone profundity. But this has not been the case with the question of American empire and the recent military campaigns in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. For many on the left, this was a political question with a cut and dried answer: the American-led military campaign was a clear expression of its imperial policies and motives, the object of which is economic global dominance. But in some ways, such assumptions **voiced** by much of the American and European left, specifically among its more dogmatic and sectarian strains, **mischaracterize and** even **misunderstand** the **reality of American** global **power and the** possible **contributions** of the western political tradition more broadly. With each passing day the events in Iraq deliberately evoke the question of American empire, and not without good reason. The neoconservative position on this has been to see American policies and its position in the world as that of a hegemon: a nation which seeks to lead the constellation of world nations into the end of history itself where the fusion of "free" markets and liberal democracy is seen to be the institutional panacea for the world's ills and with this the enlargement of capital's dominion. But the deepening morass of the occupation of Iraq belies such intentions. Paul Bremer's statement that "we dominate the scene [in Iraq] and we will continue to impose our will on this country," is a concise statement betraying not America's imperial motives, but, rather, the way that its hegemonic motives have ineluctably been pushed into a logic of imperial control. America has, in other words, become an empire by default, not by intention, and the crucial question now is: how are we to respond? **But the charge of America-as-empire is not as obvious as many have assumed** even though many superficial elements of its history point to that conclusion. Students of American political history know of the dual policies of American empire from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. "Gunboat Diplomacy" was the imperial policy of backing up all foreign territorial policies with direct military force. From the Philippines to Cuba, Grenada and Haiti, this was an effective policy, copied from the British and their acts in the Opium War, which allowed the United States to extend itself as a colonial power. "Dollar Diplomacy" was America's effort, particularly under President William Howard Taft, to further its foreign policy aims in Latin America and the Far East through the use of economic power. Theodore Roosevelt laid the groundwork for this approach in 1905 with his Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, maintaining that if any nation in the Western Hemisphere appeared politically or fiscally so unstable as to be vulnerable to European control, the United States had the right and obligation to intervene. Taft continued and expanded this policy, starting in Central America, where he justified it as a means of protecting the Panama Canal. In 1909 he attempted unsuccessfully to establish control over Honduras by buying up its debt to British bankers. In Nicaragua, American intervention included funding the country's debts to European bankers. In addition, the State Department persuaded four American banks to refinance Haiti's national debt, setting the stage for further intervention in the future. Both policies were imperial to the extent that they wanted to manipulate and use other countries as geographical means for domestic economic and political ends. To expand markets were meant, during the late 19th century and early 20th, as a means for displacing excess domestic industrial productivity, the cause of most cyclical recessions during that period. Goods produced in excess could be unloaded in more local foreign markets and there was also the return of agricultural goods and natural resources, too. We could probably say that America is once again becoming an empire of sorts, but this is something that is more recent than some may in fact think. The Cold War was a battle of hegemons, between the U.S. and the Soviets, and this has, since the latter's collapse and the ascendancy of neoconservatives to positions of influence and power in Washington, turned into a political situation where American interests are pursued unilaterally without the intervening countervailing tendencies of international institutions such as the UN. And it is here that the moment of empire begins to eclipse that of hegemony: when a single nation begins to hold direct control over foreign territory for its own interests. The Iraqi oil fields were up and running not long after the fall of Baghdad where, even now, electricity and clean water are in short supply if even existent. (An Iraqi friend in Baghdad tells me that they have power for about one hour a day.) When I visited Baghdad in January of 2003, several of my colleagues and I were fortunate enough to be able to have a private conversation with several members of the faculty from the College of Political Science at Baghdad University. For them, the consensus for political change in Iraq was clear: the ousting of Saddam Hussein was necessary for the Iraqi people and any semblance of political freedom, but it was his regime that was the problem and it was the regime, they felt, that should be the focus of UN sanctions and pressure, not the total annihilation of state institutions that the Ba'athists had inhabited and, in part, created. (See the interview in Logos, Winter 2003: 2.1 at www.logosjournal.com/issue\_2.1.pdf) Hegemony in international terms without some kind of competing force, such as the Soviets, can clearly lead to the abuse of power and a unilateralist flaunting of international institutions that do not serve at the imperium's whim. But this should not mean that hegemony itself is a negative concept. **Although empire is** something rightfully **reviled, hegemony may not be as bad as everyone thinks.** We need to consider what is progressive and transformative in the ideas and values of the western republican and liberal traditions. We need to advocate not an anti-hegemonic stance in form, but an anti-hegemonic and anti-imperialist stance in content, one that advocates the particular interests of capital of the market in more broad terms rather than the universal political interests of others. Rather than choose between western hegemony on the one hand and political and cultural relativism on the other, we need to approach this problem with an eye toward **cosmopolitanism** and what the political theorist Stephen Eric Bronner has called "planetary life." **Simple resistance to American "imperial" tendencies is no longer enough for a responsible, critical and rational left**. Not only does it smack of tiers-mondisme **but at the same time it rejects the realities of globalization which are inexorable and require a more sophisticated political response**. The real question I am putting forth is simply this: is it the case that hegemony is in itself inherently bad? Or, is it possible to consider that, because it can, at least in theory, consist of the diffusion of western political ideas, values and institutions, it could be used as a progressive force in transforming those nations and regions that have been unable to deal politically with the problems of economic development, political disintegration and ethnic strife? It is time that we begin to consider the reality that **western political thought provides** us with **unique answers to** the **political, economic and social problems of the world and this includes reversing the perverse legacies of western imperialism itself**. And it is time that the left begins to embrace the ideas of the Enlightenment and its ethical impulse for freedom, democracy, social progress and human dignity on an international scale. This is rhetorically embraced by neoconservatives, but it turns out to be more of a mask for narrower economic motives and international realpolitik, and hence their policies and values run counter to the radical impulses of Enlightenment thought. Western ideas and institutions can find affinities in the rational strains of thought in almost every culture in the world, from 12th century rationalist Islamic philosophers like Alfarabi, Avicenna (Ibn Sinna) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd) to India's King Akbar and China's Mencius. The key is to find these intellectual affinities and push them to their concrete, political conclusions. Clearly, the left's problem with the idea of the spread of western political ideas and institutions is not entirely wrong. There was a racist and violent precedent set by the French and English imperial projects lasting well into the 20th century. **The problem is in separating the form from the content of western hegemonic motives and intentions**. And it is even more incorrect to see the occupation of Iraq as a symptom of western ideas and Enlightenment rationalism. Nothing could be further from the case and the sooner this is realized, the more the left will be able to carve out new paths of critique and resistance to a hegemony that is turning into empire. And it is precisely for this reason why, in institutional terms, the UN needs to be brought back in. Although there are clearly larger political and symbolic reasons for this, such as the erosion of a unilateralist framework for the transition from Hussein's regime, there is also the so-called "effect of empire" where Iraq is being transformed into an instrument of ideological economics. The current U.S. plan for Iraq, one strongly supported by Bremer as well as the Bush administration, will remake its economy into one of the most open to trade, capital flows and foreign investment in the world as well as being the lowest taxed. Iraq is being transformed into an neo-liberal utopia where American industries hooked up to the infamous "military-industrial complex" will be able to gorge themselves on contracts for the development of everything from infrastructure to urban police forces. As time moves on, we are seeing that Iraq provides us with a stunning example of how hegemony becomes empire. It is an example of how the nave intention of "nation building" is unmasked and laid bare, seen for what it truly is: the forceful transformation of a sovereign state into a new form suited to narrow western (specifically American) interests. Attempts to build a constitution have failed not from the lack of will, but from the lack of any political discourse about what form the state should take and about what values should be enshrined in law. Ruling bodies have become illegitimate almost immediately upon their appointment because there exists almost complete social fragmentation, and the costs of knitting it together are too great for America to assume. In the end, America has become, with its occupation of Iraq and its unilateralist and militaristic posture, an empire in the most modern sense of the term. But we should be careful about distinguishing empire from a hegemon and the implications of each. And since, as Hegel put it, we are defined by what we oppose, the knee-jerk and ineffectual response from the modern left has **been to produce almost no alternative at all** to the imperatives that drive American empire as **seen in places such as Iraq**. To neglect the military, economic and cultural aspects of American power is to ignore the extent to which it provokes violent reaction and counter-reaction. But at the same time, to ignore the important contributions of western political ideas and institutions and their power and efficacy in achieving peace and mutual cooperation, whether it be between ethnic communities or whole nations themselves, is to ignore the **very source of political solutions for places where poverty, oppression and dictatorships are the norm** and **remain stubbornly intact**. Western hegemony will not be seen as problematic once the values of the western political tradition and specifically those of the Enlightenment, from the liberal rule of law, the elimination of the arbitrary exercise of power and the value of political and social equality, are set in a cosmopolitan global framework. Only then will the words of Immanuel Kant take on any kind of concrete meaning for people the world over. "To think of oneself as a member of a cosmopolitan society in compliance with state laws is the most sublime idea that man can have about his predicament and which cannot be thought of without enthusiasm."

Util is key

Isaac 2 (Jeffrey, Professor of PoliSci @ Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD Yale, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol 49 Issue 2)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law [it] can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

# 2AC

Debates about legal questions of national security inculcate agency and decision making – that’s key to activism

Laura K. Donohue, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11/13, National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying doctrinal material and creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. This is the most important determination, because the substance of the doctrinal portion of the course and the simulation follows from this decision. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. This, then, becomes a guide for the doctrinal part of the course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised in the current conversation. Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion simulations, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may provide an important way forward. Such simulations also cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it does provide a starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

#### Absent plan action the navy collapses – that’s key to check global hotspots and terrorism, extinction outweighs

Hanson 2004

Victor Davis, Professor of Classical Studies at CSU Fresno, City Journal, Spring, <http://www.city->journal.org/html/14\_2\_the\_fruits.html

The twentieth century should have taught the citizens of liberal democracies the catastrophic consequences of placating tyrants. British and French restraint over the occupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss, the absorption of the Czech Sudetenland, and the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia did not win gratitude but rather Hitler’s contempt for their weakness. Fifty million dead, the Holocaust, and the near destruction of European civilization were the wages of “appeasement”—a term that early-1930s liberals proudly embraced as far more enlightened than the old idea of “deterrence” and “military readiness.” So too did Western excuses for the Russians’ violation of guarantees of free elections in postwar Eastern Europe, China, and Southeast Asia only embolden the Soviet Union. What eventually contained Stalinism was the Truman Doctrine, NATO, and nuclear deterrence—not the United Nations—and what destroyed its legacy was Ronald Reagan’s assertiveness, not Jimmy Carter’s accommodation or Richard Nixon’s détente. As long ago as the fourth century b.c., Demosthenes warned how complacency and self-delusion among an affluent and free Athenian people allowed a Macedonian thug like Philip II to end some four centuries of Greek liberty—and in a mere 20 years of creeping aggrandizement down the Greek peninsula. Thereafter, these historical lessons should have been clear to citizens of any liberal society: we must neither presume that comfort and security are our birthrights and are guaranteed without constant sacrifice and vigilance, nor expect that peoples outside the purview of bourgeois liberalism share our commitment to reason, tolerance, and enlightened self-interest. Most important, military deterrence and the willingness to use force against evil in its infancy usually end up, in the terrible arithmetic of war, saving more lives than they cost. All this can be a hard lesson to relearn each generation, especially now that we contend with the sirens of the mall, Oprah, and latte. Our affluence and leisure are as antithetical to the use of force as rural life and relative poverty once were catalysts for muscular action. The age-old lure of appeasement—perhaps they will cease with this latest concession, perhaps we provoked our enemies, perhaps demonstrations of our future good intentions will win their approval—was never more evident than in the recent Spanish elections, when an affluent European electorate, reeling from the horrific terrorist attack of 3/11, swept from power the pro-U.S. center-right government on the grounds that the mass murders were more the fault of the United States for dragging Spain into the effort to remove fascists and implant democracy in Iraq than of the primordial al-Qaidist culprits, who long ago promised the Western and Christian Iberians ruin for the Crusades and the Reconquista.

#### Turns the K - war leads to dehumanization and social exclusion

**Maiese, 03** [Michelle, research staff at the Conflict Research Consortium, July, The Beyond Intractability Project: Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess” http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/dehumanization/]

Dehumanization is a psychological process whereby opponents view each other as less than human and thus not deserving of moral consideration. Jews in the eyes of Nazis and Tutsis in the eyes of Hutus (in the Rwandan genocide) are but two examples. Protracted conflict strains relationships and makes it difficult for parties to recognize that they are part of a shared human community. Such conditions often lead to feelings of intense hatred and alienation among conflicting parties. The more severe the conflict, the more the psychological distance between groups will widen. Eventually, this can result in moral exclusion. Those excluded are typically viewed as inferior, evil, or criminal.[1] We typically think that all people have some basic human rights that should not be violated. Innocent people should not be murdered, raped, or tortured. Rather, international law suggests that they should be treated justly and fairly, with dignity and respect. They deserve to have their basic needs met, and to have some freedom to make autonomous decisions. In times of war, parties must take care to protect the lives of innocent civilians on the opposing side. Even those guilty of breaking the law should receive a fair trial, and should not be subject to any sort of cruel or unusual punishment. However, for individuals viewed as outside the scope of morality and justice, "the concepts of deserving basic needs and fair treatment do not apply and can seem irrelevant."[2] Any harm that befalls such individuals seems warranted, and perhaps even morally justified. Those excluded from the scope of morality are typically perceived as psychologically distant, expendable, and deserving of treatment that would not be acceptable for those included in one's moral community. Common criteria for exclusion include ideology, skin color, and cognitive capacity. We typically dehumanize those whom we perceive as a threat to our well-being or values.[3] Psychologically, it is necessary to categorize one's enemy as sub-human in order to legitimize increased violence or justify the violation of basic human rights. Moral exclusion reduces restraints against harming or exploiting certain groups of people. In severe cases, dehumanization makes the violation of generally accepted norms of behavior regarding one's fellow man seem reasonable, or even necessary

#### Plan is key – clinging to heg is inevitable but technology like the plan minimizes death and ensures protection

Noorani 2005

Yaseen, University of Arizona, Tucson, The Rhetoric of Security, *CR: The New Centennial Review* 5.1 (2005) 13-41

Reshaping the world order means above all the exertion of greater control and surveillance over individuals worldwide. For the rhetoric of security is at bottom a discourse of our own redemption from the irrational tendencies that threaten collective existence, which is the whole purpose of creating civil authority in the first place. Now that individuals who have succumbed to irrationality are capable of destroying civilization, national existence must be organized not just to fend off the threat of other nations but the threat of any individual. This means that the internal moral struggle of all individuals all over the world comes under the purview of U.S. national security. As we have seen, the ultimate threat "lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology" (*National Security* 2002, ii). "Radicalism" here simply means the irrational desire for violence, and "technology" is the dangerous power that can free us or enslave us. The United States has superior technology. This technology enables the United States to wage wars against tyranny with minimal injury to the innocent and to its own forces, and to neutralize the desire for violence and the fear that inhabit everyone. So long as morally disordered individuals may possess inordinate power, we all come under their thrall due to the fear that we feel. But the world authority that we have erected has the capacity to remove violence and irrationality from the political realm and restore to us our agency, **without which we are as good as dead**.

#### **Heg solves war and stats go aff**

Drezner 05 [Daniel, Gregg Easterbrook, Associate Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “War, and the dangers of extrapolation,” may 25]

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas smakestaring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent andintensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes.[If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window. UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters: 1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot of them. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting. 2) Many commenters think what's important is the number of casualties, not the number of wars. This is tricky, however, because of the changing nature of warfighting and medical science. Compared to, say, World War II, wars now have far less of an effect on civilian populations. Furthermore, more people survive combat injuries because of improvements in medicine. These are both salutory trends, but I dunno if that means that war as a tool of statecraft is over -- if anything, it makes the use of force potentially more attractive, because of the minimization of spillover effects.

#### Deterrence works

Moore 04 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2.

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come. A useful framework in thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State, and War,12 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision for war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant. I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who may be disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposing to high risk behavior. We should keep before us, however, the possibility, indeed probability, that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders, and systematically applying other findings of cognitive psychology, as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence in context. A post-Gulf War edition of Gordon Craig and Alexander George's classic, Force and Statecraft,13 presents an important discussion of the inability of the pre-war coercive diplomacy effort to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait without war.14 This discussion, by two of the recognized masters of deterrence theory, reminds us of the many important psychological and other factors operating at the individual level of analysis that may well have been crucial in that failure to get Hussein to withdraw without war. We should also remember that nondemocracies can have differences between leaders as to the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, we should also keep before us that major international war is predominantly and critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three, specifically an absence of democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk.I5 VI Testing the Hypothesis Theory without truth is but costly entertainment. HYPOTHESES, OR PARADIGMS, are useful if they reflect the real world better than previously held paradigms. In the complex world of foreign affairs and the war puzzle, perfection is unlikely. No general construct will fit all cases even in the restricted category of "major interstate war"; there are simply too many variables. We should insist, however, on testing against the real world and on results that suggest enhanced usefulness over other constructs. In testing the hypothesis, we can test it for consistency with major wars; that is, in looking, for example, at the principal interstate wars in the twentieth century, did they present both a nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence?' And although it is by itself not going to prove causation, we might also want to test the hypothesis against settings of potential wars that did not occur. That is, in nonwar settings, was there an absence of at least one element of the synergy? We might also ask questions about the effect of changes on the international system in either element of the synergy; that is, what, in general, happens when a totalitarian state makes a transition to stable democracy or vice versa? And what, in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?

**Aggressive military action against terrorists and their sponsors is the only way to end their violence against the west - embrace of nonviolence makes future attacks inevitable.**

**Mcinerney and vallely, 2k4-** (Thomas and Paul, Lt. General USAF (Retired) and Maj. General US Army (Retired), both analysts for Fox News, Endgame: The Blueprint for Victory in the War on Terror, p. 167-8)

After the axis powers declared war on the United States in December 1941, the United States did not limit its response to fortifying the Hawaiian Islands, increasing antisubmarine patrols along the Atlantic Coast, and upgrading the efforts of the FBI to crack rings of domestic Axis sympathizers and capture saboteurs. Osama bin Laden has openly and repeatedly declared war on the United States. The radical Islamists see themselves in jihad against the West, and they see the United States as the leading “Crusader” power. They see moderate Muslims who wish live in peace as traitors. Backed by state sponsors of terror like Iran they have become a global threat just as much as the National Socialists were. Though militarily puny their dreams and their potential danger are grandiose: inflaming a billion Muslims worldwide and creating a radical Islamist empire. To that end they will cooperate with rogue states like North Korea. They will do everything they can to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The bottom line is that they must be stopped. End their state sponsorship, and they wither. Buttress the forces of moderate Islam, encourage freedom and tolerance in Islamic societies grant Muslims in Iraq and Iran the opportunity to vote against tyranny and the mullahs, then the radicals do more than wither, they disappear to the fringes of Muslim society. If we are to stop the spread of radical Islam we cannot be satisfied with the conviction of a failed terrorist bomber, dismantling a terrorist cell, or freezing the bank account of a terrorist front – however necessary all these things are. To rely purely on defensive measures cedes the initiative to the radical Islamists. Instead, we need to take the battle to them. The counteroffensives in Afghanistan and Iraq were first steps to the endgame, they are not the endgame itself. The endgame is taking down the Web of Terror entirely so that the global terror threat dissolves. We have laid out the broad parameters of an active strategy for this war. Despite the best wishes of some, the Web of Terror cannot be talked to death, no “peace process” will work, no foreign aid will suffice unless the countries involved make a commitment – as Libya has apparently done – to forgo jihad, forgo terrorism, forgo weapons of mass destruction. Countries that will not do this willingly must be compelled to do it. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are not something we have to live with; they are something that the rogue states of the Web of Terror have to live without.

**The root of terrorism is ideology – Terrorists hate us and there is nothing that can do to fix the problem besides try to stop them from being violent**

**Epstein 05** - Alex, Junior Fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute, 5-25-

[“Fight the Root of Terrorism with Bombs not Bread”, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=11243&news\_iv\_ctrl=1021]

More fundamental, poverty as such cannot determine anyone's code of morality. It is the ideas that individuals choose to adopt which make them pursue certain goals and values. A desire to destroy wealth and to slaughter innocent, productive human beings cannot be explained by a lack of money or a poor quality of life--only by anti-wealth, anti-life ideas. These terrorists are motivated by the ideology of Islamic Fundamentalism. This other-worldly, authoritarian doctrine views America's freedom, prosperity, and pursuit of worldly pleasures as the height of depravity. Its adherents resent America's success, along with the appeal its culture has to many Middle Eastern youths. To the fundamentalists, Americans are "infidels" who should be killed. As a former Taliban official said, "The Americans are fighting so they can live and enjoy the material things in life. But we are fighting so we can die in the cause of God."

 The terrorists hate us because of their ideology--a fact that filling up the coffers of Third World governments will do nothing to change. What then, can our government do? It cannot directly eradicate the deepest, philosophical roots of terrorism; but by using military force, it can eliminate the only "root cause" relevant in a political context: state sponsorship of terrorism. The fundamentalists' hostility toward America can translate into international terrorism only via the governments that employ, finance, train, and provide refuge to terrorist networks. Such assistance is the cause of the terrorist threat--and America has the military might to remove that cause.

It is precisely in the name of fighting terrorism at its root that America must extend its fist, not its hand. Whatever other areas of the world may require U.S. troops to stop terrorist operations, we must above all go after the single main source of the threat--Iran. This theocratic nation is both the birthplace of the Islamic Fundamentalist revolution and, as a consequence, a leading sponsor of terrorism. Removing that government from power would be a potent blow against Islamic terrorism. It would destroy the political embodiment of the terrorists' cause. It would declare America's intolerance of support for terrorists. It would be an unequivocal lesson, showing what will happen to other countries if they fail to crack down on terrorists within their borders. And it would acknowledge the fact that dropping bombs, not food packages, is the only way for our government to attack terrorism at its root.

The worst world for both liberty and survival is a 2nd terror strike.

Ignatieff, 4 [Michael, former director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, former Professor in Human Rights Policy at the University of Toronto and a senior fellow of the university's Munk Centre for International Studies; “Could We Lose the War on Terror? Lesser Evils,” New York Times Magazine, 5/02]

Consider the consequences of a second major attack on the mainland United States -- the detonation of a radiological or dirty bomb, perhaps, or a low-yield nuclear device or a chemical strike in a subway. Any of these events could cause death, devastation and panic on a scale that would make 9/11 seem like a pale prelude. After such an attack, a pall of mourning, melancholy, anger and fear would hang over our public life for a generation. An attack of this sort is already in the realm of possibility. The recipes for making ultimate weapons are on the Internet, and the materiel required is available for the right price. Democracies live by free markets, but a free market in everything -- enriched uranium, ricin, anthrax -- will mean the death of democracy. Armageddon is being privatized, and unless we shut down these markets, doomsday will be for sale. Sept. 11, for all its horror, was a conventional attack. We have the best of reasons to fear the fire next time. A democracy can allow its leaders one fatal mistake -- and that's what 9/11 looks like to many observers -- but Americans will not forgive a second one. A succession of large - scale attacks would pull at the already-fragile tissue of trust that binds us to our leadership and destroy the trust we have in one another. Once the zones of devastation were cordoned off and the bodies buried, we might find ourselves, in short order, living in a national-security state on continuous alert , with sealed borders, constant identity checks and permanent detention camps for dissidents and aliens. Our constitutional rights might disappear from our courts, while torture might reappear in our interrogation cells. The worst of it is that government would not have to impose tyranny on a cowed populace. We would demand it for our own protection. And if the institutions of our democracy were unable to protect us from our enemies, we might go even further, taking the law into our own hands. We have a history of lynching in this country, and by the time fear and paranoia settled deep in our bones, we might repeat the worst episodes from our past, killing our former neighbors, our onetime friends. That is what defeat in a war on terror looks like. We would survive, but we would no longer recognize ourselves. We would endure, but we would lose our identity as free peoples. Alarmist? Consider where we stand after two years of a war on terror. We are told that Al Qaeda's top leadership has been decimated by detention and assassination. True enough, but as recently as last month bin Laden was still sending the Europeans quaint invitations to surrender. Even if Al Qaeda no longer has command and control of its terrorist network, that may not hinder its cause. After 9/11, Islamic terrorism may have metastasized into a cancer of independent terrorist cells that, while claiming inspiration from Al Qaeda, no longer require its direction, finance or advice. These cells have given us Madrid. Before that, they gave us Istanbul, and before that, Bali. There is no shortage of safe places in which they can grow. Where terrorists need covert support, there are Muslim communities, in the diasporas of Europe and North America, that will turn a blind eye to their presence. If they need raw recruits, the Arab rage that makes for martyrs is still incandescent. Palestine is in a state of permanent insurrection. Iraq is in a state of barely subdued civil war. Some of the Bush administration's policies, like telling Ariel Sharon he can keep settlements on the West Bank, may only be fanning the flames. So anyone who says "Relax, more people are killed in road accidents than are killed in terrorist attacks" is playing games. The conspiracy theorists who claim the government is manufacturing the threat in order to foist secret government upon us ought to wise up. Anyone who doesn't take seriously a second major attack on the United States just isn't being serious. In the Spanish elections in March, we may have had a portent of what's ahead: a terrorist gang trying to intimidate voters into altering the result of a democratic election. We can confidently expect that terrorists will attempt to tamper with our election in November. Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, said in a recent television interview that the Bush administration is concerned that terrorists will see the approaching presidential election as "too good to pass up." Thinking the worst is not defeatist. It is the best way to avoid defeat. Nor is it defeatist to concede that terror can never be entirely vanquished. Terrorists will continue to threaten democratic politics wherever oppressed or marginalized groups believe their cause justifies violence. But we can certainly deny them victory. We can continue to live without fear inside free institutions. To do so, however, we need to change the way we think, to step outside the confines of our cozy conservative and liberal boxes.

**Prefer our scholarship - Empiricism is the most useful form of knowledge for policymakers—useful in making theories to shape policy**

**Walt, ‘5** – Prof, Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard (Stephen M., Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2005. 8:23–48, pg. 25-26, “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations,” http://www.iheid.ch/webdav/site/political\_science/shared/political\_science/3452/walt.pdf)

Policy decisions can be influenced by several types of knowledge. First, policy makers invariably rely on purely factual knowledge (e.g., how large are the opponent’s forces? What is the current balance of payments?). Second, decision makers sometimes employ “rules of thumb”: simple decision rules acquired through experience rather than via systematic study (Mearsheimer 1989).3 A third type of knowledge consists of typologies, which classify phenomena based on sets of specific traits. Policy makers can also rely on empirical laws. empirical law is an observed correspondence between two or more phenomena that systematic inquiry has shown to be reliable. Such laws (e.g., “democracies do not fight each other” or “human beings are more risk averse with respect to losses than to gains”) can be useful guides even if we do not know why they occur, or if our explanations for them are incorrect. Finally, policy makers can also use theories. A theory is a causal explanation—it identifies recurring relations between two or more phenomena and explains why that relationship obtains. By providing us with a picture of the central forces that determine real-world behavior, theories invariably simplify reality in order to render it comprehensible. At the most general level, theoretical IR work consists of “efforts by social scientists…to account for interstate and trans-state processes, issues, and outcomes in general causal terms” (Lepgold & Nincic 2001, p. 5; Viotti & Kauppi 1993). IR theories offer explanations for the level of security competition between states (including both the likelihood of war among particular states and the war-proneness of specific countries); the level and forms of international cooperation (e.g., alliances, regimes, openness to trade and investment); the spread of ideas, norms, and institutions; and the transformation of particular international systems, among other topics. In constructing these theories, IR scholars employ an equally diverse set of explanatory variables. Some of these theories operate at the level of the international system, using variables such as the distribution of power among states (Waltz 1979, Copeland 2000, Mearsheimer 2001), the volume of trade, financial flows, and interstate communications (Deutsch 1969, Ruggie 1983, Rosecrance 1986); or the degree of institutionalization among states (Keohane 1984, Keohane & Martin 2003). Other theories emphasize different national characteristics, such as regime type (Andreski 1980, Doyle 1986, Fearon 1994, Russett 1995), bureaucratic and organizational politics (Allison & Halperin 1972, Halperin 1972), or domestic cohesion (Levy 1989); or the content of particular ideas or doctrines (Van Evera 1984, Hall 1989, Goldstein & Keohane 1993, Snyder 1993). Yet another family of theories operates at the individual level, focusing on individual or group psychology, gender differences, and other human traits (De Rivera 1968, Jervis 1976, Mercer 1996, Byman & Pollock 2001, Goldgeier & Tetlock 2001, Tickner 2001, Goldstein 2003), while a fourth body of theory focuses on collective ideas, identities, and social discourse (e.g., Finnemore 1996, Ruggie 1998, Wendt 1999). To develop these ideas, IR theorists employ the full range of social science methods: comparative case studies, formal theory, large-N statistical analysis, and hermeneutical or interpretivist approaches.

**Method focus is flawed and causes paradigm wars**

**Jackson**, associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, **‘11**

(Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to **worry endlessly about foundational assumptions.** At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. Hirschman (1970b, 338) noted this very danger, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” **the focus on producing internally consistent packages of assumptions instead of actually examining complex empirical situations would result in scholarly paralysis.** Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles **as uniquely scientific**, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a firmer scientific footing by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103). The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but only after the fundamentals have been soundly established**.** Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.

**Turn—rejecting strategic predictions of threats makes them inevitable—decisionmakers will rely on preconceived conceptions of threat rather than the more qualified predictions of analysts**

**Fitzsimmons, 07** (Michael, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06/07)

But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challeng- ing. If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decision- makers.15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and complexity grows. It should follow, then, that in planning under conditions of risk, variability in strategic calculation should be carefully tailored to available analytic and decision processes. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, where analysis is silent or inadequate, **the personal beliefs of decision-makers** **fill the void**. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic sur- prise, in ‘an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.’16 The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environ- ment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and **substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction** for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves.

**Chaos is not inevitable—policies have been enormously effective—medical research, humanitarian law, and environmental regulations are just a few areas of law that have prevented enormous suffering.**

**Kurasawa, 04** (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Moreover, keeping in mind the sobering lessons of the past century cannot but make us wary about humankind’s supposedly unlimited ability for problemsolving or discovering solutions in time to avert calamities. In fact, the historical track-record of last-minute, technical ‘quick-fixes’ is hardly reassuring. What’s more, most of the serious perils that we face today (e.g., nuclear waste, climate change, global terrorism, genocide and civil war) demand complex, sustained, long-term strategies of planning, coordination, and execution. On the other hand, an examination of fatalism makes it readily apparent that the idea that humankind is doomed from the outset puts off any attempt to minimize risks for our successors, essentially condemning them to face cataclysms unprepared. An a priori pessimism is also unsustainable given the fact that long-term preventive action has had (and will continue to have) appreciable beneficial effects; the examples of medical research, the welfare state, international humanitarian law, as well as strict environmental regulations in some countries stand out among many others. The evaluative framework proposed above should not be restricted to the critique of misappropriations of farsightedness, since it can equally support public deliberation with a reconstructive intent, that is, democratic discussion and debate about a future that human beings would freely self-determine. Inverting Foucault’s Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil society’s participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come. Once competing dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility, ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of options available for our posterity.42 Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of legacy we want to leave for those who will follow us. Participants in global civil society can then take – and in many instances have already taken – a further step by committing themselves to socio-political struggles forging a world order that, aside from not jeopardizing human and environmental survival, is designed to rectify the sources of transnational injustice that will continue to inflict needless suffering upon future generations if left unchallenged.

#### States will always act to preserve security – we should save ourselves

Mearsheimer ‘1 (John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of political science at the University of Chicago and co-director of the Program on International Security Policy, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001, p. 30-32)

The first assumption is that the international system is anarchic, which does not mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder. It is easy to draw that conclusion, since realism depicts a world characterized by security competition and war. By itself, however, the realist notion of anarchy has nothing to do with conflict; it is an ordering principle, which says that the system comprises independent states that have no central authority above them.4 Sovereignty, in other words, inheres in states because there is no higher ruling body in the international system.5 There is no “government over governments.”6 The second assumption is that great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other. States are potentially dangerous to each other, although some states have more military might than others and are therefore more dangerous. A state’s military power is usually identified with the particular weaponry at its disposal, although even if there were no weapons, the individuals in those states could still use their feet and hands to attack the population of another state. After all, for every neck, there are two hands to choke it. The third assumption is that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. Specifically, no state can be sure that another state will not use its offensive military capability to attack the first state. This is not to say that states necessarily have hostile intentions. Indeed, all of the states in the system may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be sure of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty.7 There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them.8 Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state’s intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next. Uncertainty about intentions is unavoidable, which means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities. The fourth assumption is that survival is the primary goal of great powers. Specifically, states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. Survival dominates other motives because, once a state is conquered, it is unlikely to be in a position to pursue other aims. Soviet leader Josef Stalin put the point well during a war scare in 1927: “We can and must build socialism in the [Soviet Union]. But in order to do so we first of all have to exist.”9 States can and do pursue other goals, of course, but security is their most important objective. The fifth assumption is that great powers are rational actors. They are aware of their external environment and they think strategically about how to survive in it. In particular, they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival. Moreover, states pay attention to the long term as well as the immediate consequences of their actions. As emphasized, none of these assumptions alone dictates that great powers as a general rule *should* behave aggressively toward each other. There is surely the possibility that some state might have hostile intentions, but the only assumption dealing with a specific motive that is common to all states says that their principal objective is to survive, which by itself is a rather harmless goal. Nevertheless, when the five assumptions are married together, they create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other. In particular, three general patterns of behavior result: fear, self-help, and power maximization.

#### Alt fails - it represents the failed strategy of hyper-theorization – dense philosophy has no relevance to social change. In fact, practicing obscure opposition will lock in status quo oppression and get our debate programs cut.

Hartnett, ’10 (Stephen is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Communication at the University of Colorado Denver. “Communication, Social Justice, and Joyful Commitment,” Western Journal of Communication, 74:1, 68-93)

Thus far I have applauded those who have chosen to teach basic communication skills to students so that they might become more engaged citizens; I then turned briefly to those of us who have chosen to work for corporate or National Security State interests. But I am concerned here with a different group of scholars—I shall call them theory wolves—who have learned to play the tenure game for their own ben- efit while producing works about tendential subjects for miniscule audiences engaged in no real-world struggle. In short, such scholars have chosen the route of elegant irrelevance; they are, in the most dismissive sense of the word, academic. To a large extent, the rise of this subculture of postmodern cynics has followed the gradual but now well-nigh triumphant integration of European critical theory into the field of communication. This process of cross-continental cross-fertilization has matured, however, in a manner that has sapped the giants of critical theory of much of their original, countercultural force. When I first encountered European critical theorists in an English department in the late 1980s, it was understood that Marcuse and Adorno and Horkheimer and Sartre, even Freud—the God figures who launched what has become contemporary critical theory—were above all else cultural activists. I do not have the space here to delve into the details of their fights against the triple horrors of genocidal fascism from within their home countries, imperialist communism from the East, and runaway brain-dead capitalism from the West, but we should remember that they launched critical theory in the 1940s both to help make sense of and then to fight against a new stage of multinational power, not to amuse themselves or to get tenure. For the European critical theorists many of us have come to love to cite, the stakes were lit- erally about life and death. Recall the conditions surrounding Walter Benjamin’s now-canonical 1940 essay, ‘‘Theses on the Philosophy of History.’’ Writing as an exiled Jew in Paris during that dreary winter (the fascists stormed the town in May, 1940), Benjamin wrote from the edge of an abyss: He believed the world as he knew it was passing before his eyes, for each new day brought another round of Nazi atro- cities, another insult to his sense of all that was right and good and worth living for (on the dire circumstances surrounding Benjamin writing this essay, see Broderson, 1996, pp. 242–250, 250–262). Having witnessed the murder of his friends and colleagues, the sacking of nations, the destruction of great works of art and literature, and the production of propaganda so gross that it makes the Bush White House appear prudent, Benjamin warned that ‘‘even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins,’’ for he understood that history’s victors have a habit of forgetting the dead, of stepping across their bloodied bodies on the way to champagne brunches celebrat- ing the march of power (1969=1940, p. 255). For Benjamin, writing what we now call ‘‘critical theory’’ was nothing less than an effort to make sense of a world that was diving headlong into madness—his work was sophisticated, aesthetic, and philo- sophical, but above all else it was a political commentary on the end of justice.6 In that same vein, many of that generation of European theorists whom we have come to love to reference were either directly involved in or heavily influenced by the social movements that erupted across the continent in 1968 (see Quattrocchi, 1998). But something strange has happened as such European intellectual activists have become embedded in U.S. universities, where their politically motivated and culture-shaping projects have been turned into blueprints for an endless stream of essays and books focusing on the intricacies of representation, often with psychoanalytic overtones that explicitly focus on the self or the psyche rather than the community or the political. And so it is hard to imagine how those enthusiastic graduate students and assistant professors using Barthes or Baudrillard to perform intricate semiotic analyses of select scenes of Baywatch, or marshaling Kristeva to write scandalously sexy analyses of the footnotes in Freud or Foucault, or riffing on the mirror stage as enunciated by Lacan and appropriated by Irigiray, are going to empower anyone, much less challenge the status quo. In fact, if you look through any recent humanities-based journals then it will become clear that the turning of critical theory into a high-minded kind of impenetrably dense nonsense has gone so far that many of these essays could actually be read as satires. Recall the amusing case of Alan Sokal’s hoax in this regard, then read these works aloud, wait for your guests to stop guffawing, and ask yourself, What is being said? What is being argued for? What are the stakes at play?7 Fueled by the pressure to publish-or-perish, academics have turned in recent dec- ades toward ever-tighter forms of intellectual tribalism, hence resulting less in broad cultural criticism of sweeping relevance than in esoteric works of minutiae published in journals of such small circulation that they might legitimately be called secret. As Mark C. Taylor (2009) argues in an editorial in The New York Times, under these conditions ‘‘each academic becomes the trustee not of a branch of the sciences, but of limited knowledge that all too often is irrelevant for genuinely important problems. A colleague recently boasted to me that his best student was doing his dissertation on how the medieval theologian Duns Scotus used citations’’ (p. A21). Communication has been particularly susceptible to this trend toward hyperspecialization, for our historical insecurity in the face of other, more well-established fields such as history and literature, to say nothing of the sciences, has left us less interested in broad-ranging scholarship than in turf-building. As William Nothstine, Carole Blair, and Gary Copeland (1994) argue, this institutional insecurity led early generations of communication scholars to pursue a tightly delineated version of disciplinarity-as-isolation, of intellectual production based on ‘‘quarantine[ing] aca- demic experience from contamination by knowledge, practice, and experience from outside the discipline’’ (p. 21). The result was a field shackled by provincialism. The turn toward European critical theorists could be understood on the one hand, then, as offering a welcome break from this imposed provincialism; yet on the other hand, it could also be read as the culmination of the quest for tribal security. Indeed, when microscopically focused scholarship mixes with the heady critical theory discussed above, the resulting work can appear awe-inspiringly intelligent, for here is the work of experts, high priests of a rarified version of intellectual production. At the same time, such works are often received by those outside the high council of experts not only as impenetrably dense and gleefully irrelevant but even as willfully perverse, as if our research was not meant to be edifying, enlightening, and empowering so much as endured. Some of the consequences of the proliferation of this postmodern cynicism have been articulated powerfully by Regina Barreca (2009), who argues that the practitioners of this brand of high-fallutin’ hyperdisciplinarity are the wolves, the con artists of university life. They could talk for an hour or write for twenty pages with convincing authority and yet leave an audience unsure of what, precisely, was under discussion. They used jargon as a form of ritual magic, to obscure and confuse rather than to explain and illuminate. . . . Unswervingly hostile to their colleagues who remained in the academic underbrush, they adopted detached, sardonic poses at conferences. . . . They liked their key phrases; they had a habit of repeating themselves to the point that their signature lines were not so much a refrain as a sign of pathology. . . . Everything they approached was intellectual roadkill. . . . The resulting pieces of criticism are about as useful as origami but not nearly as aesthetically pleasing (p. 12).8 We need to be careful when encountering such passages not to mistake personal sour grapes for an intellectual argument; and we need to be equally careful not to allow such critiques of over-the-top theory wolves to slip into an across-the-board anti-intellectualism; still, Barreca illustrates how postmodern cynicism has changed our conferences, our classrooms, our departmental relationships, and our modes of production. One of the obvious consequences of this form of intellectual produc- tion is ‘‘a gradual erosion of the public’s good will’’ regarding what universities do and stand for (Callan & Immerwahr, 2008, p. A56). When tax dollars are poured into departments that celebrate faculty who produce jargon-riddled nonsense that treats the rest of the world like so much roadkill, it should come as no surprise to find poli- ticians (and some students’ parents) screeching about the inanity, and even depravity, of intellectuals. (There are many factors involved here, but it is significant that ‘‘state investment per public university student’’ stood at ‘‘a 25-year low in 2005,’’ Newfield, 2009, p. A128.) And so, even as they invoke theorists who were once hounded because of their oppositional politics, and even as they write in tones of high indignation laced with terms like intervention and counterhegemonic and transgressive and border-crossing (Sokal’s spoof offers a compendium of such terms), the much- published practitioners of postmodern cynicism have become a political liability: They are the new easy targets for anti-intellectuals who want to continue cutting our budgets or even shut down our departments. The response to such attacks is not to cower in silence, to dumb down our writings, or to run from the controversy, but rather, to create pieces of moral clarity and writerly elegance wherein we demonstrate our central roles in enhancing democratic life.9